

# SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES

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- Community Participation in Forest Management, Darel Valley, Northern Areas of Pakistan  
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## SOUTH ASIA STUDIES

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Dr. Sadiq Ali Gill

*Editor-in-Chief*

Dr. Karamat Azim

*Literary Editor*

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### Correspondence

All correspondence should be directed to the Editor-in-Chief, *South Asian Studies*, Centre for South Asian Studies, University of the Punjab, Quaid-i-Azam Campus, Lahore, Pakistan.

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# India – Pakistan Through Time

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DR. SADIQ ALI GILL

The Indian subcontinent was created in Geophysical violence. A mass of floating land collided with Asia; in the process the Himalayan Mountain was created. So tremendous was the collision that the Himalayas are still rising.

The subcontinent of India was born in a moment similarly awesome, historically portentous and a destructive moment that continues to send powerful vibrations even now. On August 14-15, 1947, the nearly 400 million people of the subcontinent broke the shackles of many centuries of rule by foreign Sultans, Emperors and the British Colonialist: India, fractious and poor, united to evict its sophisticated conquerors—and did so through non-violent means.

But then something awful happened. Unity and transcendence turned to division and thirst for blood. The subcontinent itself was torn into three separate parts. Its people, formerly nonviolent fighters for freedom, became neighbourly mass murderers. Hindus and Sikh on one side, Muslims on the other, the only thing that joined them now was hatred and a fury difficult to explain—and universally repented.

After 55 years of existence, the subcontinent is on the brink of a revolution. India, the region's giant, is shedding its pathological inferiority complex, and reaching out to a modern world, it maintained a distance. An economic miracle is possible if more than a billion people get better opportunities. That world would be genuine cause for being proud.

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Dr. Sadiq Ali Gill, Director Centre for South Asian Studies, Quaid-i-Azam Campus, University of the Punjab, Lahore.

Unhappily, the fact of partition ensures that no celebration shall escape a circumscription of mourning and loss. Even at the moment of freedom, those festivities were tainted. Shortly before midnight, August 14, 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru, who was the potential, Prime Minister of India, and was to take over, a few minutes later, explained eloquently his people's successful "tryst with destiny," a reference to the glorious freedom struggle. But by the time Nehru spoke, 20,000 people had already been murdered in violence prompted by the prospect of partition. In the three month after Pakistan came into being some 12 million people, migrated to it, (India) and hundreds of thousands more perished.

Partition:- an arid term for an event so drenched in blood, madness and mass tragedy was for more than a division that changed the destinies of one of the most populated region of the earth, and it continues to do so. Partition created Pakistan, with such a tenuous hold on unity that it split in half in 24 years later and is still unable to unite its ethnic groups. Its eastern wing became Bangladesh, one of the world's poorest, and over populated countries; it has 120 million people earning an average of \$275/- per year. Partition and its slaughters converted India and Pakistan into archenemies. They have fought three wars and continue to spend huge amounts on their armies. Both have nuclear weapon programs, share many a values and enjoy the same films; but there is barely any trade allowed between the two countries, and cross-border visits are as few as the authorities can manage. The alienation seems eternal: reunification is never discussed. In India, an assortment of disgruntled minorities—Nagas, Kashmiris, Assamese—make the same demand (independence) today, with bombs and ambushes even after 55 years of the original partition. Which may explain why a half-century of freedom was observed silently throughout the subcontinent, with soul-searching supplements in newspapers rather than fireworks and festivals.

It's impossible to overstate the impact of the years of freedom on the subcontinent's consciousness; the movement forged a nation called India from an enormous mob of linguistic groups, ethnic identities and rival castes. Schoolbooks, grandparents' tales and popular culture have planted the story deep into the imagination of the young. For many young Indians, the movement was Golden Age they missed.



Partition has a far smaller claim on the popular imagination, having been almost psychologically detached from the uplifting events that preceded it. Partition fiction is mostly published in vernacular languages, which restricts readership, and films attempt to portray the events in all its epic tragedy has appeared on television in recent years; but hardly over the big screen. There is a mass of historical literature on both sides of the border; but predominantly obsessed with one question: What caused partition and the slaughters surrounding it?

There is plenty of blame to go around: when British decided to grant independence to the subcontinent the population of nearly 400 millions was 66% Hindus and 24% Muslims, it was a serious social divide. The purity requirement of Hinduism prevented inter-relationship, including marriage and even meal sharing, and Muslims were generally poorer than their Hindu counterparts. The British encouraged the divide among the groups to avoid joint agitation, called the divide and rule policy. A highly durable concept in India, which led to never ending Hindu Muslim enmity resulting in partition and mass slaughter. Divide and rule preordained a fractured subcontinent.

But that theory ignores many significant milestones and misjudgments along the road. From 1920, Hindu India led by the Indian National Congress under Gandhi, the barrister turned nonviolent agitator. Gandhi wanted the Muslim community in his movement—who were fiercely against the British, though hardly committed to nonviolence—and to achieve that, he embraced the cause of the Ottoman Empire, whose Caliph was the protector of all Islamic holy sites. That strategy worked, but when the Caliphate itself disintegrated in 1924, Muslims on the subcontinent were left without their link to a pan-Islamism and grew acutely insecure in predominantly Hindu India. In 1930, poet-philosopher Sir Muhammad Iqbal demanded a Muslim state in the subcontinent. In 1933, a group of students at Cambridge University made up the name Pakistan, an acronym including initials from Punjab, Afghania (the current North West Frontier Province of Pakistan), Kashmir, Sindh and the last three letters of Baluchistan.

The 1930's and 40's were some of the best moments of the freedom movement—such as Gandhi's famed salt march, a 388 km protest walk against British taxes and setbacks and continuous negotiations with Britain over self-rule. In 1946, the British proposed an ambitious and intricate federation to which all parties agreed, including Mohammad Ali Jinnah, leader of the powerful Muslims league. But Nehru newly elected head of the Congress party, made an unfortunate remark at a press conference saying the plans were subject to change by the Congress, Jinnah was enraged and Nehru, too proud to back down, let the statement stand. That was India's last chance at an undivided future. On August 16, 1946, thousands of Muslim gathered at pro-Pakistan rallies in Calcutta. Rioting led to mass murder and Hindu Reprisals, and local blacksmiths worked around the clock producing weapons. Five thousand were dead in 72 hours: the gutters of Calcutta were clogged with corpses. It was mayhem unlike any India had seen before. "The slaughter definitely made the partition inevitable, "It was the point of no return." The riots spread and over the next year 20,000 people died as Muslims demanded Pakistan and Hindus promised a different fate: "graveyardistan".

In March 1947, Lord Louis Mountbatten, great-grandson of Queen Victoria, became the last viceroy of India, charged with negotiating independence with Gandhi, Nehru and Jinnah. The job was hurried up, because India seemed on the brink of civil war. On June 3, partition was formally confirmed although the boundaries were announced later. Freedom came 30 minutes apart for the two countries Nehru told his people that their trust with destiny had been achieved. It was, in fact, a situation that was just building steam.

The immigrants were on the move: poor people with humble possessions, staggering in the summer heat in groups comprising half a million, stretching 80 km. They passed each other on way to their new homes in Hindu India or Muslim Pakistan. Wajahat Hussain was a 21-year old army officer on the new border bisecting Punjab in 1947. Near the town of Julundur, 103 Km from the border, a trainload of would be resident Sikhs had attacked Muslim refugees. When he reached the

scene, Hussain found corpses jumbled on the ground with fresh blood swords and tied-up bedding. The landscape was still with death, in the midst of the carnage was an elderly woman, still alive and crying for her relatives: her arms and legs had been amputated, Hussain also found a mass of abandoned women still alive and crying for their relatives; their arms and legs amputated. Then he entered some bushes and found naked women of all ages, dismembered and raped, surrounded by crying, crawling babies.

The transfer of people was supposed to be as nonviolent as the freedom struggle. Gandhi, fearing trouble in Calcutta, under-took a peace mission that calmed the air. Where he was absent, so were his principles. Hindus were angry at Muslims for the splitting of the country. Sikhs were enraged over the loss of their lands to Pakistan. Some killings were retaliatory: a trainload of murdered Muslim refugees coming from India provoked a "ghost train" of dead Hindus going to India. Much of the carnage was the result of rumors of atrocities that hadn't actually occurred or attacks that weren't forthcoming and of course, everyone was doing it, including the British-trained police. "People on both sides had gone mad," "No sane person can explain it. The entire people were caught in frenzy.

Indian writer Nirad C. Chaudhuri, who turns 100 this year, blames Gandhi and his freedom struggle. He argues that the Mahatma needed a mass campaign to drive the British out, but his movement was narrow in scope and its foundation was the hatred shared by Hindus and Muslims for the British. He says the sophisticated, foreign-educated leaders of the freedom struggle didn't know the average Indian and disregarded the masses tendency to violence, "Mahatama Gandhi thought that his admonitions about non-violence would be listened to"

There is an argument that partition saved India as a united nation. It will always have its ethnic and caste difference but the added strain of Pakistan and Bangladesh's hundreds of millions might have tipped the ever delicate balance. There's a contrary argument, of course, that the subcontinent would have had a far superior 56 years by remaining a single country, a federation, or by acting like friendly neighbours. "One may imagine a very powerful south Asia if they had managed to live in peace"

Bangladesh and India today enjoy an improving equation. The partition slaughters in East Pakistan were lesser in scope than in Punjab. India's military might has helped secure Bangladesh's own freedom from Pakistan in 1971. Travel agents, in fact, see booming business in people revisiting their original homes on the other side of the border.

Between India and Pakistan, however, the past 50 years have been long, warlike and demonstrably unhealing. "Pakistan was born with a basic advantage" says I.A. Rehman, Director of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. The country's most popular slogan once was Pakistan Zindabad, or long live Pakistan. Today, a more common usage is Pakistan forever—a discernible taunt to India. On its side, India continues its provocations large and small. It is building missiles capable of delivering atomic weapons—while Pakistan reportedly buys its from China—and India still controls flights from New Delhi to Islamabad to deny respect to the Pakistani Capital. The Muslims who stayed behind in India, a populous 120 millions, are less secure today than at any time since partition. "The drama of partition cast a dark shadow on the bitter legacy of the past".

Estrangement exists in the halls of power and on the streets, engulfing old and young. On a bus in Paris I was hailed by another subcontinental passenger. "Are you Indian?" asked the stranger, I said from Pakistan. "Oh India and Pakistan are one and the same," replied the stranger, then, "I said. "Can I say you are Pakistani?" the Indian smile faded and turned away. The subcontinent gained freedom 56 years ago, along with borders, unimaginable bloodshed and a permanent enemy within.

# The Quaid-i-Azam as a Statesman and a Political Strategist

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DR. MUHAMMAD ZAHID KHAN LODHI

The Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Founder of Pakistan was the greatest Statesman and Political Strategist of 20th Century. No single individual played a greater role for the liberation of Indian Muslims and the creation of a sovereign and independent state for them, than the Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. His achievement lies in the fact that he single-handedly fought two rival nations, i.e., the Hindus and the British. Within a short span of seven years after the Lahore Resolution was passed in March 1940, he successfully steered the ship of his nation to an independent state.<sup>1</sup>

As a statesman and a Political Strategist, the Quaid's role can be divided into two parts:

- (i) His role in the Pre-Independence period and
- (ii) His role in the Post-Independence period

I. The role of a mediator is not an easy one as he has to please both the parties. The Quaid played a significant role in the Lucknow Pact (1916) as he was known as an Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity at the time. Under this pact, he successfully obtained concessions from the orthodox, rigid and fanatic Hindu leaders of the Indian National Congress. The Muslim League and the Indian National Congress came at par with each other, being contracting parties. Separate Electorates, a demand put forward by the leaders of the Muslim delegation which met Viceroy Minto at Simla on 1<sup>st</sup> October 1906, which had been introduced by the British Government under the Minto-Morley Reforms (1909) and had been "bitterly attacked by the Hindus", now became, under the Pact,

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Dr. Muhammad Zahid Khan Lodhi Principal and Ex-Chairman, BISE, Rawalpindi.

the agreed demand of the Congress and League.<sup>2</sup> So, for the first time the Muslim demand for Separate Electorates received the support of the Indian National Congress. Provincial Authority formed the basis of the scheme. Under the Lucknow Pact, the Muslims were also given weightage in the Central Legislature and in the Legislatures of those provinces where they were in minority. It was laid down "that no bill, nor a resolution introduced by a non-official member affecting one or the other community shall be processed with, if three-fourths of the members of that community in that particular Council, Imperial or Provincial, opposed the bill or any clause thereof or the resolution."<sup>3</sup> So, three-fourths of the Muslim members could put a stop to legislation sponsored by non-official members if they thought it adversely affected them. True, the same was applicable to the Hindus, but "three-fourths of the Hindu members would in any case constitute a large proportion of the various legislatures, whereas three-fourths of the Muslim members would still be a small minority in most legislatures."<sup>4</sup> Though the Muslims obtained these concessions from Hindus by converting the representation of their two majority provinces, the Punjab and Bengal into minority, still the Muslims could muster practical influence on account of their majority in these provinces.

Once the leaders of the Indian National Congress repudiated the provisions of the Lucknow Pact in the form of Nehru Report (1928), the Quaid-i-Azam immediately reverted to the announcement of his Fourteen Points (1929) which safeguarded the interests of the Muslims in a remarkable manner at that time. He took a firm stand for the national interest of the Indian Muslims so as to force the Congress leaders to come to terms with him.

He categorically declared in unequivocal terms that the Indian Muslims were a separate nation and not a minority.

"The Muslims are not a minority. The Muslims are a nation by any definition"<sup>5</sup> and by all canons of International Law.<sup>6</sup>

He urged Gandhi and the Congress leaders to realize that Muslims were not a minority but a nation.<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, they should be bold and honest to acknowledge that the Congress was a Hindu body and did not represent anybody except the Hindus.<sup>8</sup>

On the eve of Lahore Session of All-Indian Muslim League on 22nd March 1940, the Quaid declared in his presidential Address:

It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality."<sup>9</sup>

**He added further :**

The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literatures. They neither intermarry nor interline together and indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions."<sup>10</sup>

The Quaid made it categorically clear that the Hindus and the Muslims could no longer be welded together as their aspects "on life and of life" was different.

The Hindus and Muslims derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, different heroes and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other and likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one a numerical minority and the other a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state."<sup>11</sup>

By successfully projecting the Indian Muslims as a separate nation from the Hindus, the Quaid had bought the Muslims at par with the Hindus who were in numerical strength.

The Quaid-i-Azam stressed the need for unity amongst the rank and file of the Indian Muslims.

"We Musalmans believe in one God, one book : the Holy Quran and one Prophet (peace be upon him). So we must stand united as one nation."<sup>12</sup>

He appealed to every Muslim to stand solidly behind him for the achievement of National freedom. "our goal of Pakistan", he declared, "is a matter of life and death to us and to the future destiny of Muslim India. Either we achieve Pakistan or we perish. "Let us today be one in spirit and mind. Let us be united as a solid nation and come under the banner of All-Indian Muslim League and further augment and strengthen our organization."<sup>13</sup> By virtue of his intelligence and charismatic leadership, the Quaid-I-Azam had successfully integrated the Indian Muslim under the banner of All-India Muslim League.

The year 1940 is considered as a landmark in the history of Indo-Pakistan subcontinent as it proved a turning point in the Hindu-Muslim relationship. The Muslim League categorically declared that nothing short of the demand for Pakistan shall be acceptable to the League. Other schemes would neither be acceptable nor workable.

In order to counter the determination of a separate homeland for the Muslim,<sup>14</sup> the Indian National Congress and its Hindus leaders resorted to negative secret overtures with the British Government, the following significant events took place in India on the eve of its independence.

- (a) Sudden recall of Lord Wavell before the expiry of his tenure.<sup>15</sup> Wavell was the sole exception whose tenure was suddenly cut short on political basis.
- (b) Appointment of Mountbatten on Political base for a very brief period of 143 days – whereas the normal term of office of the viceroy was 5 years.
- (c) Mountbatten worked as an Agent of the Hindus.<sup>16</sup> Even before joining his new assignment, the viceroy designate pleaded the cause of the Hindus in the meeting of the British Cabinet held on 13 March 1947 at 10-Downing street that the Punjab and Bengal should be divided on communal basis. Being Muslim majority provinces, both of these provinces should have been incorporated in Pakistan without any division.



It was almost a mission with Mountbatten and the British Government to leave behind a United India after their departure from the subcontinent. The Hindu leaders urged Mountbatten to play a "historic" role in this continent.<sup>17</sup> Mountbatten himself confessed:

Nothing I have seen or heard in the past few weeks has shaken my firm opinion that with a reasonable measure of goodwill between the communities a United India would be by far the best solution of the problem.<sup>18</sup>

### To Quote him again

My own feeling was that a united India was, of course, the right answer.<sup>19</sup> The Viceroy "argued endlessly the cause of a unified India."<sup>20</sup> A unified India with a strong Centre was his best choice, while a United India with a weak Centre was his second best.<sup>21</sup>

The Quaid was most distressed at the way Mountbatten's mind was working for a United India because it meant permanent and complete subjugation of the Muslims by the Hindus i.e., freedom not for the Muslims but for the Hindus only. Mountbatten considered it as a "very great tragedy" if the Quaid would force him to give up the idea of a united India.<sup>22</sup> The Viceroy called the Quaid as "a psychopathic case" who was "intent on his Pakistan".<sup>23</sup>

It was on account of the unshakeable stand taken by the Quaid-I-Azam that the "reluctant"<sup>24</sup> Mountbatten, the British government and the Congress leaders had to bow and agree upon the division of India.

- (d) Mountbatten's ambition to become Common Governor-General of Bharat and Pakistan which became an obsession with him.<sup>25</sup> The Quaid's right decision, and refusal to yield to his wishes, ambition and lust for power, otherwise it would have sounded the death-knell for the independence of Pakistan as a separate, independent and sovereign state.

- (e) The British Government had announced to transfer power in India by June 1948.<sup>26</sup> Mountbatten precipitated the process of independence ten months earlier. So, every thing had to be done with the greatest haste. It had taken 3 years to separate Burma from India, 2 years, to separate Orissa from Bihar, but only 2 months were taken to divide the whole India in two.
- (f) In order not to make Pakistan a viable state, the Muslim majority provinces, the Punjab and Bengal were divided by Mountbatten on the suggestion of the Congress leaders.<sup>27</sup> The Viceroy also jeopardized the Muslim interest through the device of "other factors" which worked only to the benefit of "one party" ( the Hindus).<sup>28</sup> The general impression amongst the Pakistanis is that the original Boundry Award was amended by Radcliffe at the instance of Mountbatten. Though the British Government, its press, members of the Parliament, Radcliffe and Mountbatten, all vehemently repudiated any change in the original Boundry Award, yet the recently released confidential documents of the British Government reveal that the charges that:

Lord Mountbatten altered the Radcliffe Boundry Award at Pakistan's expense and that he failed to take action against the Sikhs in time, are unfortunately true.<sup>29</sup>

- II. If the role played by the Quaid-i-Azam in the pre-independence period was significant one, it was in no way less significant in the post-independence period. The measure adopted and decisions taken by the Quaid during this period were more assertive and of a vital nature which exhibit fine qualities of his statesmanship.

The period can be divided into two parts :

- (a) Internal and (b) External

## INTERNAL

1. The early period was of a great turmoil in the history of Pakistan. Pakistan which started from a "search"<sup>30</sup> had to create its entire administrative machinery hastily at Karachi and was obviously placed in a miserable and deplorable condition as it had "practically nothing of his own."<sup>31</sup>

On August 15th 1947 when the flag of independence was unfurled, our offices had neither chair, nor pen nor inkstand nor paper nor pencil.<sup>32</sup>

There was only one typewriter in the whole Foreign Office.<sup>33</sup> Very few states in the world started with greater handicaps than Pakistan did on August 14, 1947.<sup>34</sup>

The trains bringing the staff and record were combed 'enroute'. The records were destroyed and many servants killed.<sup>35</sup> All the premises of the diplomatic and trade missions abroad were taken over by India and Pakistan had either to hire or buy or build new buildings for its embassies and offices everywhere and had to recruit personnel in a hurry in order to man them.

Under these deplorable and miserable conditions, the Quaid-i-Azam managed the administration of Pakistan efficiently and in a remarkable manner with only seven members of his cabinet.<sup>36</sup>

Then, the Muslims genocide in India was followed by the refugee problem, which was "the greatest danger to the country".<sup>37</sup> Within a few days of Pakistan being created, "one million Muslims lost their lives in the communal riots that followed and about 7 million refugees came into Pakistan within six months of its establishment from across the border. We were unprepared to stand this stain. Even our friends said that Pakistan would not survive the refugee problems."<sup>38</sup>

There was little doubt "the massacre of Muslims in East Punjab and their expulsion to Pakistan was deliberately planned,"<sup>39</sup> well organized and directed.<sup>40</sup> The Quaid-i-Azam complained and reported the matter to the British Minister, Mr. Atlee :

"Every effort is being made to put difficulties in our way by our enemies in order to paralyse or cripple our state bring about its collapse."

The Quaid-i-Azam wanted "a team of commonwealth representatives to visit India and Pakistan for Joint discussions."<sup>42</sup> He hoped that "a round table discussion"<sup>43</sup> by common wealth members will facilitate in finding an amicable solution of the critical difficulties of India and Pakistan. The British Prime Minister and his Cabinet thought that "it would be undesirable to encourage these Government to accept the proposal for a Conference."<sup>44</sup> An empirical investigation of data collected from original and archival material suggests that when the Government of Pakistan attempted other amicable methods like mediation, arbitration or reference of the case to the U.N., the British Government endeavored to discourage and undo those attempts.<sup>45</sup>

However, it is worth mentioning that Pakistan with its meager and limited sources, did provide food, medicine and clothes to the millions of refugees under the talented leadership of the Quaid.

3. As early as July 1947, the Quaid brought to the notice of the Viceroy, the Sikh Plan.<sup>46</sup> Had Mountbatten acted upon the advice of the Quaid and rounded up the Sikh ring leaders including Tara Singh, on the eve of transfer of power, mass massacre could have been averted. But on the advice of Nehru, Sardar Patel, Governor Punjab (Evan Jenkins) and the Governors- designate of the East and West Punjab, Mountbatten cancelled his earlier decision.<sup>47</sup> Subsequently events proved Quaid's foresightedness and disservice of British-Hindu leaders for the subcontinent.

4. George Cunningham (Governor NWFP) and Messervy (C-in C Pak. Army) proposed to the Government of Pakistan for the withdrawal of regular forces from Waziristan.<sup>48</sup> Perhaps they wanted to make this political experiment and test the effectiveness, vitality, viability and strength of Islam as a bond of unity. The Quaid promptly accepted their challenge and vacated troops from North and South Waziristan.

This shows Quaid's strong and unflinching faith in Islam. The impact of this re-orientation of Pakistan's policy towards the tribal people was encouraging.

5. Bharat withheld Pakistan's share of Financial and Military assets. The undivided India's cash balances as on the date of partition were estimated about Rs.400 crores. Pakistan's share was fixed at Rs.75 crores.<sup>49</sup> Pakistan's share was 18.75 percent of the total amount. The Reserve Bank of India also withheld "assets of approximately 125 crores belonging to Pakistan."<sup>50</sup>

Pakistan's Foreign Minister complained in the Security Council of India Government's "interference with the Reserve Bank so as to destroy the monetary and currency fabrics of Pakistan."<sup>51</sup>

The Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee had made agreed recommendations, which were accepted by the joint Defence Council that military assets between the two Dominions be divided in the proportion of 64% to India and 36% to Pakistan. Claude Auchinleck, supreme Commander of the armies of India and Pakistan, sent a stunning report to the British Prime Minister on 28 September 1947.

I have no hesitation whatever in affirming that the present India Cabinet are implacably determined to do all their power to prevent the establishment of the dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis. In this I am supported by the unanimous opinion of my senior officers and indeed by all responsible British Officers Cognisant of the situation.<sup>52</sup>

The Quaid-i-Azam appealed to his loyal friends to provide monetary help to the state so that it should not derail on account of lack of finances. Consequently, the Nawab of Bahawalpur, Isphahani, Dawoodpota, The Nizam of Hyderabad etc. rendered valuable services in this connection.

### EXTERNAL

Quaid's contribution as a statesman in the internal affairs of Pakistan was marvelous. But this contribution in its external relations was in no way less significant.

6. The Quaid deplored the antagonistic behaviour of the Hindu leaders towards Pakistan :

"It is amazing that the top-most Hindu leaders repeatedly say that Pakistan will have to submit to the Union of India. Pakistan will never surrender. It is an aim which is foolish and in impossible of achievement now."<sup>53</sup>

The Quaid roared like a lion :

Pakistan "has come to stay and play its great role for which it is destined. Nothing on earth now can undo Pakistan."<sup>54</sup>

7. Out of 565 Princely States, Junagadh was the first state to accede to Pakistan and its Government announced the decision on the very day of the transfer of power. It also completed legal processes by 15th September 1947. The rulers of States of Manvadhar, Mangrol, Sardargarh, Bantva and Jodhpur also announced their accession to Pakistan. While the ruler of Junagadh was in Karachi, the Diwan, Shah Nawaz Bhutto "requested the Government of India to take over the administration of Junagadh."<sup>55</sup>

The Quaid wanted to send Pakistan forces to Junagadh and assist the state; but in the meeting of the Defence council, Admiral

Jefford pointed out that Pakistan was helpless as it had limited ammunition to which the Quaid remarked that "It would be suicidal to attempt to intervene."<sup>56</sup>

Displaying the great qualities of his statesmanship, the Quaid accepted the accession of these states. Kashmir and these states make an excellent case of self-contradiction for India. If defamed India a lot. In the UN Security Council, Mr. Acre of Argentina pointed out paradoxical stand of the Indian Government by

"Upholding one theory Junagadh with one part of the liberty and the opposite theory on Kashmir with the other part of the liberty."<sup>57</sup>

To quote the British Office file :

India "blames Pakistan for accepting Junagadh's accession, but claim that her own acceptance of Kashmir's accession is perfectly justifiable. This does not make sense."<sup>58</sup>

8. Nizam of Hyderabad wanted to be independent.<sup>59</sup> (In this connection he addressed his letters not only to the British Prime Minister, and the King but to the American President Truman as well). Subsequently he had a leaning in favour of Pakistan because the Nizam was impressed by the personality of the Quaid. So he preferred the accession of his state with Pakistan over India, despite the fact that Hyderabad was a "land-locked-state"<sup>60</sup> and surrounded by the Indian territory from all sides.

The Nizam did send his delegation headed by Prime Minister, Mir Laik Ali, for talks with the Quaid but unfortunately he was too late. The Quaid was on his death bed. The members of the delegation kept on waiting for hours for the improvement of the health of the Quaid who was in a coma, being frustrated they returned.<sup>61</sup> Soon the Quaid died and considering it as the most appropriate occasion, the Indian armed forces invaded Hyderabad. India could not dare to attack the State during the Quaid's life time.

9. When India sent its forces to Kashmir, the Quaid-I-Azam immediately ordered the officiating C-in-C Pakistan Army, General Gracey.

“To send troops into Kashmir to seize Baramula and Srinagar also Banihal Pass and to send troops into Mirpur district of Jammu.”<sup>62</sup>

It is lamentable that Gracey did not obey the orders of the Quaid. First, he tried to persuade the Quaid that this was not possible, because the Pakistan Army was not in full strength nor fully equipped. When the Quaid did not listen to his excuses, he refused to obey. Had the orders of the Quaid been obeyed and implemented in the letter and spirit, Kashmir would have easily become a part of Pakistan: because the Indian forces, which had six battalions in Kashmir by the end of October 1947, had no footing there. Even the irregular forces (tribesmen) were easily liberating parts of Kashmir and heading towards Srinagar whose fall was “imminent.”<sup>63</sup>

If tribesmen could liberate a vast area of the State of Jammu & Kashmir, the regular armed forces of Pakistan could positively have conquered the entire State. The Quaid’s directive to General Gracey was “Correct and wise.”<sup>64</sup> He had pin pointed the areas (Bharamula, Srinagar, Banihal Pass and Mir Pur), only a seasoned military commander with the depth of background of Kashmir could have issued such an order.

The Quaid-i-Azam termed the so-called ‘Instrument of Accession’ of Hari Singh with India as “fraudulent and impossible to accept”<sup>65</sup> as it was also based in “violence.”<sup>66</sup> After a lapse of more than 50 years, the research scholars who make an empirical investigation and impartial analysis on Kashmir, are arriving at the same conclusion what the Quaid had remarked in 1947. i.e., the so-called Instrument of Accession was a “fraudulently signed letter from the Maharaja.”<sup>67</sup>



## CONCLUSION

The Quaid-i-Azam role as statesmen and a political strategist is marvelous. Whether in the pre-independence or post-independence period, the interest of the Indian Muslims was supreme to him. He was "a man of honest convictions and clear purpose. No one could for a moment doubt his whole-hearted and single-minded devotion to the cause of the Muslim of the Indian Continent. It was the honesty of his convictions and the clarity of his purpose which marked him out as a great leader of his people."<sup>68</sup>

The British Prime Minister, Attlee remarked "Mr.Jinnah's unswerving devotion to the ideal of Pakistan and his tireless work for it will always be remembered."<sup>69</sup>

The early period after the independence was crucial for the survival of Pakistan, as its problems were immense as well as manifold. Pakistan's enemies were determined to wipe out its existence and openly declared that it would not survive. Though the State of Pakistan which ultimately emerged in 1947 was not so strong as visualized by the Quaid but only "a moth-eaten", "mutilated" and "truncated Pakistan" yet<sup>70</sup> he endeavored his best to make it a viable and strong state. He faced and solved the problems of Pakistan with courage and determination and worked selflessly with a dedicated spirit and missionary zeal.

With his constant failing health, weak and feeble physique, he roared like a lion: "Pakistan has come to stay-nothing on earth now can undo Pakistan". It is the irony of fate that the Quaid could not live long and died one year and twenty days after the creation of Pakistan. He lived and died for Pakistan. Forty day's mourning was rightly declared by the Government of Pakistan after his death.

No man in the history of Indian Muslims had been so loved and so idealized. No man in living memory evoked such unquestioned loyalty, such deep devotion and such strong faith than the Quaid-i-Azam.

The Quaid-i-Azam was the most fascinating, captivating and a towering personality of the 20th Century. In fact, his star shines more brightly by contrast with the foil of darkness against which it flashes out; for while Washington, Lenin and Soekarno were the brilliant representatives of brilliant time and places, he was the sole point of light in his quarter of the firmament.<sup>171</sup>

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# Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah : The First Governor-General of Pakistan 1947-48

MOHAMMAD NAYYAR IQBAL

The controversy whether Pakistan should have its own Governor-General or share common Governor-General with India has been debated at length by a number of modern Indian historians. There is enough evidence in most of these studies to suggest that Lord Mountbatten was himself deeply interested in becoming the common Governor-General of both India and Pakistan. The question was first raised in the 'heads of agreement' later presented to the respective representatives of the Congress and the Muslim League on 16 May 1947. The sixth item of this Agreement provided that the Governor-General should be common to both the Dominions and that the present Governor-General should be re-appointed.<sup>1</sup> It would naturally have been a great achievement from the British point of view if both the Congress and the Muslim League had requested Mountbatten to accept the joint Governor-General ship of the two states which would have meant that both the parties had full faith in his impartiality. For Mountbatten himself it would have been a "crowning glory" of his career and as a consequence posterity would have remembered him as a magician statesman:

Who had not only achieved the impossible by smoothly solving the dreaded Indo-Pakistani problem with the consent of Hindus and Muslims but, who, at the same time, had attained the unthinkable by winning in equal measure the trust of both these historical foes.<sup>2</sup>

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Mohammad Nayyar Iqbal Assistant Professor, Government Degree College, Satellite Town, Rawalpindi.

Lord Mountbatten who had consistently shown special consideration to the Congress leaders was soon to be rewarded. On 17 May 1947 Nehru wrote to him that the Congress would welcome the proposal that the interim period the Governor-General of the two Dominions should be common to both the parties, "For our part we should be happy if you would continue in this office and help us with your advice and experience"<sup>3</sup> but the Quaid-i-Azam was not favourably disposed to appointment of Mountbatten as the Governor-General of Pakistan. He instead wanted him to become a super Governor-General, appointed by the Crown with powers to arbitrate between the claims of two Dominions for the just division of assets and liabilities.<sup>4</sup> The Quaid's proposal was favoured neither by the Congress<sup>5</sup> nor by the British Government, which termed it as "unconstitutional and unworkable."<sup>6</sup>

Finally Attlee announce in the House of Common that Mohammad Ali Jinnah had been appointed Governor-General of Pakistan and that Lord Mountbatten has on the request of the Congress Leaders, accepted to remain on as the Governor-General of India. Quaid-i-Azam's decision to be the first Governor-General of Pakistan was in fact due to his being strict constitutionalist throughout his career. He could not understand how an unconstitutional Governor-General with no powers at his disposal would discharge his responsibilities. And that he would also not be able to solve the complicated and unsettled problems of the partition if he got conflicting advices from the Governments of the two dominions<sup>7</sup> A joint Governor-General for the two sovereign states with opposite interests and directions, in his opinion was "constitutional absurdity."<sup>8</sup>

Moreover, the Congress Leaders and the British statesmen, right from the Prime Minister down to the opposition leaders, were busy in giving the impression to their own countrymen and to the world at large that the separation of Pakistan from India might not endure. The British Prime Minister, C.R. Attlee hoped that the two proposed States of India and Pakistan in the course of time "will come together again to form one great member State of the British Commonwealth of Nations."<sup>9</sup> The leader of the opposition, Harold MacMillan, saw in the partition, "the seeds of some form of future unity."<sup>10</sup> The Secretary of State, Lord Listowel, also hoped that, "when the disadvantages of separation have



become apparent... The two Dominions will freely decide to reunite in a single Indian Dominion."<sup>11</sup> In the light of these statements Mountbatten's appointment as Head of the State of Pakistan would have given the impression that Pakistan was still carrying the yoke of Britain.<sup>12</sup> The people of Pakistan in that case had a right to ask, "What sort of Independence have we got when the Governor-General of India is our Governor-General and the King of England is our King."<sup>13</sup>

The Quaid-I-Azam had already appointed three British Officers as the Chiefs of the Armed Forces and he had also told Mountbatten that he wished to appoint British Governors in the three provinces of Pakistan. He had also informed him that the only way he could make his people accept all these appointments was that he himself should be the Governor-General of Pakistan.<sup>14</sup>

He had taken this decision in the hope that, "his towering personality would overshadow everything else and would cover up British Governors, and military and civilian officers."<sup>15</sup>

The time for independence was running short and Mountbatten's patience for becoming the Governor-General of both India and Pakistan was daily mounting. In order to convince the Quaid-I-Azam that a common Governor-Generalship would be in the best interest of Pakistan, Mountbatten met him on 23 June. It was in this meeting that the Quaid-I-Azam informed him of his intention to assume the office of the Governor-General of Pakistan. In the words of Mosley:

It is rule of my life, that I must always consider the interests of my people. At various times in my life, I have had to pass over those dearest and nearest to me, But have doue my duty".<sup>16</sup>

Mountbatten, however, broached this subject with Quaid again on 2nd July and told him that if he became the Governor-General of Pakistan his powers "would be constitutionally restricted and that he would act only on advice."<sup>17</sup> He therefore, advised the Quaid to accept the office of the Prime Minister of Pakistan because it was the only position through

which he could "really run Pakistan."<sup>18</sup> All these arguments failed to create the desired effect and Khan Liaquat Ali Khan formally informed Mountbatten on 5 July that Quaid-i-Azam would himself be the first Governor-General of Pakistan. It was perhaps the most serious disappointment that the last British Viceroy had ever experienced. This decision "had not merely caused him political worry, but had hurt him. Perhaps he had set his heart on becoming Joint Governor-General, but the rebuff knocked against his most vulnerable point, his pride."<sup>19</sup> He had also lost face with the British Government whom he had all along led to believe that the Congress and the Muslim League would "agree to his appointment as the common Governor-General of both Dominions."<sup>20</sup> His bitterness at the decision of the Quaid can be gleaned from the following report that he sent to His Majesty's Government after his crucial meeting with the Quaid :

I asked him "Do you realize what this will cost you? He said sadly, 'It may cost me several crores of rupees in assets', to which I replied somewhat acidly, 'It may well cost you the whole of your assets and the future of Pakistan.'<sup>21</sup>

It is important to observe here that the Quaid's decision to become the Governor-General of Pakistan saved his country and helped it survive partition, its defence and all that went with it."<sup>22</sup> One of the two means to achieve this objective was a common Governor-Generalship for the initial period, an intention frustrated by Mr. Jinnah and the other, the joint Defence Council. Though operative for six months after the transfer of power, it was undermined in its general and long-term purpose by the enmity between the two Dominions after the Punjab troubles and the Kashmir conflict.<sup>23</sup>

The Quaid-i-Azam took the oath of his office on 15 August 1947 and became the first Governor-General of Pakistan. He was the recipient of the highest office the state could bestow upon him. It may be pointed out here that his position was remarkably different from the position enjoyed by his counterparts in other Dominions. He was not only the constitutional figurehead enjoying limited powers, but was the Father of

the nation and the Quaid-i-Azam whose "prerogatives were enlarged by popular acclaim far beyond the limits laid down in the constitution."<sup>24</sup> In his capacity as the Quaid-i-Azam, no legal or formal limitations could apply on him.<sup>25</sup> His influence over his people was so great that he "Could have held any position or none; he would still have ultimate authority in his own person."<sup>26</sup>

The Quaid no doubt enjoyed extraordinary powers but these powers were conferred upon him by the Cabinet to meet the extraordinary circumstances that clearly demanded extraordinary measures. "Well, gentlemen, I am prepared to function as a constitutional Governor-General but I shall have to announce it to my people, that I am so."<sup>27</sup> His Prime Minister promptly assured him that "you will be the constitutional Governor-General, but you will naturally be experiencing the powers inherent in you as the Father of the Nation."<sup>28</sup> The members of the Cabinet also voluntarily decided that "he could overrule the Cabinet"<sup>29</sup> but he neither overstepped the constitutional limits nor imposed his decision on the Cabinet. He always pleaded his point of view with compelling logic but would always welcome and appreciate any opposite opinion, provided it was equally backed by facts and reasons.<sup>30</sup> In the words of one of his Cabinet Ministers,

He guided the Cabinet and the nation with unexampled ability, sagacity, farsightedness, sympathy, integrity and selflessness ( and ) at the same time he never deviated from democratic conventions and constitutional propriety.<sup>31</sup>

Under section 9 of the Indian independence Act, vast powers had been placed at the disposal of the Governor-General and he was authorized to make such provisions as appeared to him to be necessary or expedient.

For making omissions from, additions to, and adoptions and modifications of, the Government of India Act, 1935 and the order-in-council, rules and other instrument made there under, in their application to the separate new Dominions.

These extraordinary powers to combat the peculiar circumstances arising out of partition were to be enforced in both the Dominions till 31 March 1948, but the initial difficulties were so great that this period had to be extended in Pakistan by one year for which a provision had been laid down under section 8 of the Indian independence Act, 1947. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, pleading for extension of this period in the Constituent Assembly said,

We may find ourselves in difficulty if the Governor-General does not have the special powers and it would not be possible every time to convene a meeting of the constituent Assembly whenever one was faced with some difficulty or the other with regard to the running of the state.<sup>32</sup>

It was evidently not possible to hold a meeting of the Constituent Assembly at a short notice because the distance alone between Eastern and Western Zones of Pakistan would make it difficult for the state if immediate action was heeded and not taken by the Governor-General of Pakistan.<sup>33</sup> Thus the constituent Assembly extended this period by one year.

According to Section 19 (1) m of the Indian Independence Act, the Ministers were to be chosen by the Governor-General and were to hold office during his pleasure. The Quaid thus himself selected the Prime Minister and other members of the first Cabinet. He used to preside over the Cabinet meetings and was also the Chairman of the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet. He himself held the Ministry of State and Frontier regions and of Evacuees and Rehabilitations.<sup>34</sup> The Governor-General's powers exercisable in his discretion and in his individual judgment had been withdrawn and he was expedited to act only on the advice of his ministers. There was, however, no specific provision that made it obligatory that the Governor-General must act on the advice of his ministers. This was indeed a striking omission.<sup>35</sup>

The Government of India Act, 1935, under Section 102, had empowered him to declare the state of emergency in case the country was threatened by war or by internal disturbance. While retaining these

emergency powers in the interim Constitution of the Constituent Assembly further empowered the Governor-General to declare a state of emergency in case "the economic life of Pakistan is threatened by circumstances arising out of the mass movement of population from and into Pakistan." In case of emergency he also enjoyed the powers to make laws for a province or any part thereof in respect of any matter enlisted in the Provincial list. Under Clause 6 of Section 102 if he considered that an inevitable danger existed, he could declare a proclamation of emergency even before the security or economic life of the country was threatened by the actual occurrence of war or disturbance or any other circumstances. The Quaid used these emergency powers when some of the Provinces<sup>36</sup> showed their reluctance to absorb the refugees who had crossed over to Pakistan. Most of these unfortunates from India had sought refuge in the West Punjab. The Provincial Government could neither stop their influx nor could its economy bear the burden of their settlement and rehabilitation. It, therefore, soon became evident that unless these refugees were also settled in other provinces the problem would never be solved. In the N.W.F.P almost all the non-Muslim had left for India and the property they left behind had already been allotted to the local population. Thus the opportunity to settle the refugees in that province was practically lost. In Sind, however, the situation was different. There were large tracts of land that could be easily made available to the incoming settlers but the question of Sindhi versus non-Sindhi was raised to stop the refugee from occupying the property left by non-Muslims. The local landlords, in the words of the Finance Minister Ghulam Muhammad, "were so much poisoned against the refugees that in some places not only were they turned out but they were attacked." While "the refugees had no place to live, the houses left by Hindus were lying vacant and were kept for their favourites: The Sindhis and none else."<sup>37</sup> It was with a view to meeting this situation and accelerating the pace of speedy settlement and rehabilitation of the refugees who were still in the West Punjab that on 27 August 1948 the Governor-General

issued a proclamation of emergency under section 102 of the interim constitution. It read as follows :

Whereas the economic life of Pakistan is threatened by circumstances arising out of the mass movement of Population from and into Pakistan, a state of emergency is hereby declared.<sup>38</sup>

The question whether the state of emergency in this case was declared by the Quaid on his assessment of the situation on the basis of the reports that the provincial Governors were regularly sending him is difficult to answer. It is, however, not likely that "the Governor-General himself might have suggested that, since the persuasive methods of the Central Government had failed, They should seek his assistance and a State of Emergency should be declared."<sup>39</sup>

It would be interesting to refer here to another incident in which the Quaid exercised his influence as the father of the nation rather than as the Governor-General of Pakistan. It pertained to the issue of selecting Karachi as the federal Capital. The decision to make the city of Karachi as the Capital of Pakistan had been taken before Independence. It was considered to be an appropriate place for the Capital of the country because it had an international Airport and a seaport that provided ready means of communication with the Eastern Wing of the Country and the outside world.<sup>40</sup> Sindh moreover was the only Province, which had requested the Quaid to locate the Capital of Pakistan there.<sup>41</sup> It had also offered the official residence of the Provincial Governor to serve as the Governor-General's House and the Sind Assembly building to be used as the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. This initial show of enthusiasm, however, was not destined to last long and as early as 2 February 1948 the Sind Assembly, through a resolution, unanimously opposed the contemplated move of the Government Of Pakistan to remove the city of Karachi from the control of the Sind Provincial administration and place it under its own jurisdiction as a centrally administered area. The controversy brought to light the conflict and tension between Sindhi and non-Sindhi interests in Karachi. The Sindhis, it appears, feared that they would be overwhelmed by the non-Sindhis in their own Province and hence their opposition.

The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan through a resolution in May 1948, however, decided to make Karachi the Capital of Pakistan. Mohammad Ayub Khuro who had lost the premiership but still retained political influence was thus provided with an opportunity to reassert his leadership as the champion of Sindhi interests and he started a campaign of vigorous opposition against this decision. It was largely due to his influence that the Sind Muslim League Assembly Party refused to accept the decision of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. A committee of Action was also constituted to observe the 'Karachi Days. However, before seeking his advice. Accordingly, a five member delegation led by Hashim Gazder waited upon the ailing Governor General at Ziarat. In the course of the meeting the members of the delegation made it quite clear that they were anxious to know his views "not so much as the Governor General but as the Quaid i Azam."<sup>43</sup> His advice was that they should give up the agitation and accept the decision of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. He expressed the hope that the proposed arrangements would be beneficial to the people of Karachi and its suburbs because they would get better opportunities of employment and livelihood. He also assured the delegation that full compensation would be paid to the Sindh government for the taken over buildings. It was principally due to the Quaid's commanding position and prestige that despite the opposition of certain local leaders the Sindh Muslim League parliamentary party endorsed the advice of the Quaid-i-Azam by a vote of twenty six to five.<sup>44</sup>

It may be pointed out here, that, despite the Plenitude of Power which he enjoyed as the father of the nation, there was not even a single instance in the entire period of his tenure as the Governor General when he overstepped, much less misused, his authority. Even at the risk of a little digression one instance may be quoted here. In the last days of his life when the doctors advised him to move from Ziarat to Malir, near Karachi, he expressed his inability to do so as he did not own a house there. The doctors said that this could be arranged by requesting the Nawab of Bahawalpur to vacate his house for the personal use of the Governor General. The Quaid is reported to have rejected this suggestion and told the doctors :

You know, in the old days, when any practicing lawyer was appointed a judge of the High Court in Bombay he gave up going to clubs and social functions, in fact some of them did not even read the local newspapers in case they might be prejudiced against any individual who was going to be tried before them. As Governor General of Pakistan I cannot ask his Highness the Nawab of Bahawalpur for the loan of the house. I am afraid this is impossible.<sup>45</sup>

In the first year of Pakistan when a serious conflict developed between Nawab of Mamdot and Mumtaz Mohammad Khan Daultana in the Punjab, he was requested to intervene and use his powers as the head of the state and suspend the Constitution and promulgate Governor General's rule, his answer to this request was strictly constitutional :

The Act empowered him to suspend the constitution in a province only when the security of the State was threatened. He could not construe the Mamdot Daultana clash, which was an internal party matter, as a threat to Pakistan security. Therefore, he was not prepared to invoke his powers under section 92(a).<sup>46</sup>

Similarly when a proposal of separating the party offices from public offices was made he personally did not like "the decision of keeping the offices separate but he had left it to the League Council to decide."<sup>47</sup> When the Council of the Pakistan Muslim League finally decided that no League member holding a Government office could occupy any office in the Muslim League the Quaid accepted the decision. When an attempt was made by a Councillor of the N.W.F.P. to exempt the Quaid from this rule he declined this special exemption because he was the Governor-General and "Constitutionally could not hold office in a political party. As Governor General he had to safeguard the interest of all sections and parties in the Pakistan Dominion."<sup>48</sup> Sir George Cunningham, the Governor of the N.W.F.P who worked directly under the Quaid for nine months after independence confirms, "the Quaid-i-Azam never let party spirit interfere his conduct of this office."<sup>49</sup> He scrupulously avoided undue interference in the smooth flow of legal and parliamentary traditions. This is evidenced by the fact that when a provincial government wanted



the Quaid to issue an ordinance only a few days before its legislature was to get into session he flatly refused to oblige : for by-passing the legislature was not to be countenanced."<sup>50</sup>

A few words on the position of the Quaid-i-Azam as the Governor General of Pakistan may be said in the context of the position and powers enjoyed by his counterparts in other dominions. In the first instance it needs to be remembered that the Governor General of other His Majesty's Government were appointed on the advice of Dominion Cabinets. In the case of India and Pakistan they, due to the exceptional circumstances, were chosen by the successor authorities namely, the Congress and the Muslim League. Therefore, the King did not, as is ordinarily understood, appoint them. The Quaid's appointment, too, was no doubt made by the King and he was to hold office during His Majesty's pleasure but as he himself said it was "purely a form; nothing but a form. The Governor Generals are the chosen of the people and that is the reason why I have accepted this honour."<sup>51</sup> Secondly, the oath that was administered to the Quaid was also different from the traditional oaths administered to the Governors General of the British Dominions, in which they were to bear "true faith and allegiance to his majesty. The Quaid on the other hand "affirmed true faith and allegiance to the constitution of Pakistan."<sup>52</sup>

The Quaid-i-Azam in his capacity as the President of the Constituent Assembly signed the Bills passed by the Constituent Assembly of the country. He disliked assenting to the Bills in His majesty's name, as was required under Section 6 (3) of the Independence Act, 1947, he struck out this phrase when he assented to Bills under the Government of India Act.<sup>53</sup> Nor can the Quaid-i-Azam's position be compared with the British Governors-General of India because he was answerable to the British Parliament through the Secretary of State for India. The Governor General of Pakistan was to subject to no such control.

Thus the Quaid's position and his rule in the first year of Pakistan's existence were unique. It could be, in the words of a distinguished writer, compared to that of Plato's Philosopher King as described in the

Republic or that of a supreme law giver as described in Rousseau's *Social Contract*.<sup>54</sup> It is also significant to note that though he was given fast and unlimited powers in the new state. The Round Table has succinctly summarized his position in the following words:

Conscious perhaps that his end was not far off, he had been careful not to make himself the corner stone of his edifice, as he would have, if he had actually assumed the dictatorial power that were within his grasp.<sup>55</sup>

It would, however, be pertinent as well as interesting to compare the position of the Governor-General of Pakistan with that of Lord Mountbatten, his counterpart in independent India. Governor-General in March 1947, as a precondition of the acceptance of the office, the British Government had conceded him "full powers to carry out his assignment without reference to London and without constant interference from London."<sup>56</sup> This was unprecedented and theoretically unconstitutional but it worked as probably nothing else would have worked.<sup>57</sup> Accustomed to "personal authority" and unrestrained power, it was a foregone conclusion that as the Governor-General of free India Mountbatten was "bound to be more than a mere distinguished figurehead."<sup>58</sup>

After India's independence, Mountbatten retired to Simla probably to show the world that the Indians themselves were running their State, but he was immediately called back to Delhi and the Indian leaders requested him to take over their Government because they themselves admitted that they were versed in the art of agitation, not administration.<sup>59</sup> Accordingly a secret understanding was reached between Mountbatten and the India leaders according to which the former took direct control of the Indian Government and it was shown to the outside world that Nehru and Patel were governing India. Mountbatten formed an Emergency Committee of the Cabinet that included his favourite ministers :

The Committee was called into immediate session and Nehru sat on Mountbatten's right, Patel on his left. They were given no choice. They had to say 'yes' we rather like the idea to any proposal that he made. And if they disagreed, they could go to hell.<sup>60</sup>

Mountbatten himself confessed, that nobody knew this manipulation of power by him for years and years.<sup>61</sup>

Mountbatten's chronicler Alan Campbell Johnson, who had referred to even the most minor events, which took place during this significant constitutional deviation. He has accused Jinnah for having "dictatorial powers unknown to any constitutional Governor General representing the King"<sup>62</sup> but has quickly stockacked Mountbatten's authority and power which he fully and freely exercised as the "constitutional" Governor-General of free India. The fact of the matter is that Lord Mountbatten as the Governor-General of Independent India "exercised more executive authority in certain spheres than he enjoyed as an autocrat viceroy. His personal contribution to the determination of history was more decisive after, than before the transfer of power."<sup>63</sup>

To conclude it may be said that Quaid-i-Azam's decision to become the Governor-General of Pakistan was full of wisdom and a step in the right direction. He assumed the responsibilities of the onerous office "not because he was thirsting for power and splendor but because he owed it to his people to steer the ship of the nascent State in the most critical period of its existence."<sup>64</sup> Despite his poor and failing health" he was determined to give the people of Pakistan the guidance and control which he knew they needed, and, indeed, demanded from him."<sup>65</sup>

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# Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Kashmir Issue (1944-1948) : An Assessment

SYED UMAR HAYAT

Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah is well known in history as a steadfast follower of constitutional methods in solving the political problems. He did not deviate from this principle during his long struggle for the restoration of the rights of the Muslims of the Subcontinent including the Pakistan movement. Hence, a dire need is felt to review his role regarding the Kashmir issue particularly after his assumption of power as the first Governor-General of the Pakistan. This article is an effort to identify as well as assess his mode of approach in dealing with the issue.

The Quaid's involvement with the affairs of Kashmir started in 1944 when the Quaid was invited by the Kashmiri Muslim leaders to bring about a compromise between the National Conference and Muslim Conference. He entered the state of Jammu and Kashmir on 9th May 1944 and stayed there up to 22nd July 1944. During this nearly three month's stay in Kashmir the Quaid made vigorous efforts to awaken the Kashmiri Muslims and forge unity among them, so that, they could attain their political, social, economic, cultural and other rights through their own efforts. Keeping these in view the Quaid attended the annual session of the Muslim Conference held in the compound of jami'a Masjid of Srinagar on 17 June 1944. Over one hundred thousand Muslims were gathered there to hear him.<sup>1</sup> A portion of his speech delivered at this occasion seems to be worth reproducing :

God has given you every-thing. Kashmir, which is known as a  
paradise and a Gem in the world is an unparalleled country;

Syed Umar Hayat, Research Fellow, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research (Centre of Excellence), Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

there is nothing that this country does not possess? Awake, work hard and bring life to this dead Nations. Improve the condition of your Nation in every sphere of life. There is only one way to do it and that is unity, solidarity, a single flag, a single platform and an ideal. If you are able to achieve them, you must succeed.<sup>2</sup>

The above address shows that he knew it quiet well that the future of Kashmir could not be separated from the fate of the Muslims of the entire region. But what practically happened is ironical. The policies pursued by the Indian National Congress as well as the British created a lacuna as well as a continuous irritant in the region.

“Many would agree”, as Ian Stephens says, “That the root of all evil, in the post-partition relations between Indian and Pakistan has lain in the Kashmir dispute...”<sup>3</sup> The root cause of one of the most dragging political problems of the world<sup>4</sup> lies mostly in the dubious attitude as well as appraisal of the British Government which was in an unnecessary promptitude in catering their responsibilities.<sup>5</sup> Here, the aforementioned political problem of the state of Jammu and Kashmir needs to be touched upon with its background, so as to have a shortest possible account of its inception without which the reader may not be able to understand the same with clear and necessary perspectives. It is a fact of the recorded history that at the time of the partition as per the decision of the then Governor-General Lord Mountbatten, all the five hundred and sixty five Indian states had to accede to Pakistan or India on the basis of their geographical position in relation to the new frontiers, or by the predominance of Hindus or Muslims in their population.

The state of Jammu and Kashmir which was then being ruled by a Hindu Maharaja, an insensitive despot, both rich and powerful.<sup>6</sup> In such a situation as per aforementioned formula of accession to Pakistan and India, Kashmir was supposed to be merged with Pakistan and the Hindu Maharaja did not have any authority to decide the fate of the Kashmiri Muslims without the consent of the People of the state. Instead within fifteen days of partition of India, the Lord Mountbatten asked General Lord Ismay the Chief of the Viceroy's Staff “to do his best to get the



Maharaja to... accede without further delay to whichever Dominion he and his people desire."<sup>7</sup> This advice by Lord Mountbatten led to the Maharaja's accession to India and that was sheer violation of the accession principle and the will of the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir.

At this stage it is desirable to highlight the relations between Lord Mountbatten and Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. It is a historical fact that Mountbatten's attitude towards the Quaid was not comfortable at all. That is why the Quaid himself complained, "The Viceroy does not understand."<sup>8</sup> This utterance of the Quaid to his secretary, nevertheless, gives a clear picture of the difficulties faced by the creator of Pakistan. Hence, it is quiet understandable how bitter this relationship would have become when the Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Lord Mountbatten became the Governor-Generals of Pakistan and India respectively, moreover Mountbatten's one-sided approach and support for India "startled "Ian Stephens, the then editor of the Statesmen while dining with him two month after the creation of Pakistan."<sup>9</sup> In fact, the British authority practically wanted "a strong, post-independence India against a weakened Pakistan."<sup>10</sup> In pursuing this policy they were in favour of India retaining Kashmir even without any Land access to it. And in order to provide a linkage with Kashmir the radcliffe award allotted Ferozpur and and Zira tehsils to India. It needs to be emphasized that those were predominantly Muslim majority areas.<sup>11</sup> The policy of the Quaid on the princely states particularly regarding the state of Jammu and Kashmir can be derived from his statement delivered in July, 1947 :

"I have already made it clear more than once that the Indian states are free to join either the Pakistan constituent assembly or the Hindustan constituent assembly or remain independent.<sup>12</sup> I have no doubt that they, the Maharaja and the Kashmir Government, will give the closet attention and consideration to this matte and realize the interest not only of the ruler but also of his people."<sup>13</sup>

This statement of the Quaid clearly indicates that he believed that the people of the state of Jammu and Kashmir were free to decide their future in accordance with their wishes. At the same time, the accession of

the state with Pakistan in his view would be in the greater interest not only of the concerned people but also the Maharaja's dynastic interest. It was for this reason that he desired to go to Srinagar to discuss a probable solution of the problem, but Mountbatten the then Governor-General of India dissuaded him.<sup>14</sup>

Here one thing is required to be pointed out that, on the one hand Mountbatten forbade the Quaid from going to Kashmir and on the other he was instrumental in arranging Gandhi's visit, for the first time in his life, to the beautiful state of Jammu and Kashmir on August 1, 1947. He met the Maharaja and the Prime Minister besides having series of discussions with the workers of the National Conference. It may be mentioned here that Ram Chandra Kak, the then Prime Minister of Kashmir, despite being a Hindu, opposed the state's accession to India. Hence Gandhi not only made efforts to oust Ram Chandra Kak but also persuaded the Maharaja to decide in favour of India.<sup>15</sup>

As a next step the Indian Army was moved towards Kashmir. The Quaid flew to Lahore on 26 October 1947 to be nearer to Kashmir and "to watch the fate of the Muslims in Kashmir"<sup>16</sup> Colonel Birnie, the Quaid's first military secretary, wrote in his diary after the Quaid's return to Karachi on 1 December 1947.

I was quite definitely shocked to see him. He left here five weeks ago, looking 60 years of age. Now he looks well over 80... I drove from the airport with him and Miss Jinnah and felt most sorry for him. He openly said that his fever was due to mental strain and that he prayed for a chance of getting away, where nobody could worry him, for at least a fortnight.<sup>17</sup>

These facts seem to be sufficient to understand the Quaid's attachment with the fate of Kashmir and his profound sorrow for the helpless Muslims of the state.

In the meantime at the end of August 1947, the Muslims of Poonch revolted and formed their own Azad (Free) Kashmir Government. On the other hand the Maharaja ordered his troops to crush the Muslims. The

Quaid learned on 24 October 1947 that five thousand tribesmen from the North-West Frontier had crossed into Kashmir to help their fellow Muslims. The Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir arbitrarily acceded to India on 26 October 1947. On the same day the Quaid flew to Lahore from Karachi. Colonel Birnie wrote in his diary:

Quaid's visit in connection with the troubles in Kashmir, which are becoming very serious. Mountbatten is to join him in Lahore to discuss the problem. The whole situation is really shocking. The root of the matter; they both thoroughly distrust each other, Jinnah has many high principles, and many of his apparent indecisions are due to the fact that he is in doubt as to what line is the correct one to follow. He refuses to decide until he has shifted the question from every point of view.<sup>18</sup>

In such a situation the Quaid, who did not want war with India,<sup>19</sup> decided to send his half-formed army to protect the Muslims of Kashmir against the Indian Army. According to Stanley Wolpert the Quaid, on 27 October 1947, ordered his "acting" British Commander-in-Chief General Sir Douglas Gracey<sup>20</sup> to move two brigades of Pak Army to Kashmir—one from Rawalpindi and another from Sialkot. The Sialkot army was to march to Jammu to make the Maharaja a prisoner. The Rawlapindi column was to advance to Srinagar and capture the city. General Gracy refused to obey the orders of his Governor-General without the approval of the Supreme Commander. (Field Marshal Auchinleck). This insubordination hurt the Quaid much, but in the prevailing situation an effective alternative was not immediately possible.

But the Quaid never accepted the Maharaja's accession to India because the accession was not a bonafide one since it rested on 'fraud and violence' and would never be accepted by Pakistan. He was of the opinion that this accession was the end of a long intrigue and it had been brought about unconstitutionally. During the meeting with Lord Mountbatten and Lord Ismay on November 1, 1947 in Lahore, the Quaid said, he had "lost interest in what the world thought of him since the British Commonwealth had let him down when he asked them to come to the rescue of Pakistan." The Quaid made his point more clear when Sir L.G.Smith the British High Commissioner in Pakistan, met the Quaid-i-Azam in Karachi on 9 December 1947. He discussed various issues with the Quaid including the Kashmir issue. In his report Sir L.G.Smith wrote:

Mr. Jinnah spoke with some emotion of the lack of response forthcoming to his appeal for a commonwealth discussion of Indo-Pakistan tensions, and he said that, if it had been possible for these issues to be discussed round a table in September last, the tragedy of Kashmir might well never have occurred. He asked me point-blank what His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom were going to do, and whether they really wanted to help Pakistan or not.<sup>21</sup>

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah had realized that India wanted to maintain total control over the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Besides, India would never be ready to accept any form of plebiscite that could be detrimental to their planning. That is why he was in favour of setting up an impartial administration in the state of Jammu and Kashmir after the proposed cease-fire. Without a guarantee to that effect he was not ready to ask the Muslims in Kashmir to lay down their arms.<sup>22</sup> At the same time the Quaid was very clear on the point that the Kashmir dispute could be solved through negotiations between India and Pakistan. The Quaid on November 1, 1947 suggested to India that the two Governor-Generals duly authorized by their respective Dominions, should accept responsibility of the task of setting up a neutral administration in Kashmir and of organizing a plebiscite in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.<sup>23</sup> As the Quaid wanted a bilaterally negotiated settlement of the problem of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, hence he never wanted any sort of unnecessary involvement of any outside party in the process. He remained so strict to this principle that he did not personally favour the intervention even of the United Nations Organisation or of any outside authority.<sup>24</sup>

For the negotiated settlement of the issue of the state of Jammu and Kashmir the Quaid naturally wanted a very conducive political environment to be created for further progress in a peaceful phenomenon. That is why on December 9, 1947 during a detailed discussion with the then the British High Commissioner in Pakistan Sir L.G. Smith, the Quaid highlighted various aspects of the issue. During the course of discussion the Quaid made it clear that "the most urgently important matter for decision was the form of administration to be set-up in Kashmir on the cessation of hostilities."<sup>25</sup>

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah as lover of peace as well as constitutional methods in solving the problems, was ready to do anything necessary for peace, but at the same time his efforts in that direction would go in vain unless the other party of the problem i.e., India was ready to do the needful urgently required for further progress in peace making. On this point, the point of view of the Quaid has been recorded by the then British High Commissioner Sir L.G. Smith and that seems to be worth reproducing:

The authorities in the North West frontier Province could have prevented the tribesmen from their incursion into Kashmir by shooting them down and thus starting a conflagration of uncalculable consequences in the frontier. Great efforts had been made, and made successfully, he said, to restrain masses of tribesmen from following the first party into Kashmir, by exercise of political pressure on their leaders. He was emphatic that the movement in Kashmir was the inevitably natural result of cruelly repressive action taken against the Muslims of Poonch by Kashmir state forces, as punishment for their attitude favouring the State's accession to Pakistan, and that, but for these atrocities, the tribesmen would not have gone in.<sup>26</sup>

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah did not have the opportunity to save the Kashmiri Muslims from injustice and the merciless repression of the Indian Army but remained mentally disturbed for their prolonged sufferings. In such a situation the Quaid, who was surrounded by countless pinching problems at the time and after the creation of Pakistan, could not devote his time and energies to this issue. But the "last year of Mohammad Ali Jinnah's life" says Hector Bolitho, "was saddened by his despair over the fate of Kashmir."<sup>27</sup> What the Quaid said on August 27, 1948 i.e., less than two weeks before his death, reminds us of his concern for the Kashmiri Muslims and also gives us a way out. In his Eid-ul-Fitr message to the Muslim World the Quaid said, "We are all passing through perilous times. The drama of power politics that is being staged in Palestine, Indonesia and Kashmir should serve an eye opener to us. It is only by putting up a united-front that we can make our voice felt in the counsel of the World".

In conclusion it can be safely stated that the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah was a peace loving political leader and when he came to power he never deviated from the path. When the problem of the state of Jammu and Kashmir emerged, the Quaid followed the lawful ways without any deviation. The Quaid, while following the legitimate course, was sure that the people of the state of Jammu and Kashmir would decide their future without any sort of outside interruption and interference.

But when the dispute emerged as a result of abandonment of the legal path by the opponent parties i.e., the Indian and the British Governments, the Quaid adopted the bilateral process in solving the problem. Here one thing needed to be made clear, that being a very wise man the Quaid wanted to solve the problems at the local level without any unnecessary expansion of the arena. It, nevertheless, does not mean that he would stick to that principle at a time when expansion of the canvass was unavoidable. That is why the Quaid desired a suitable role to be played by the Commonwealth of Nations at the stage when India was making deadlock in solving the problem of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

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8. Ibid., p.279

9. Ibid.

10. Andrew Roberts, *Eminent Churchillians*, (London, N.p. 1994), p.93 c.f., Riaz Ahmad "Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah's Kashmiri policy as a Governor-General of Pakistan", in Riaz Ahmad, ed., *Papers presented the International Seminar on Quaid-i-Azam, Pakistan and Kashmir*, 8-9 May, 1996, vol. 1, (Islamabad, Quaid-i-Azam Univeristy, N.d.), p.14

11. In the tehsils of Ferozepur and Zira population was 55% and 65% respectively, see, Andrew Roberts.

12. Initially it was suggested that the state could remain independent without joining India or Pakistan but later this option was eliminated.

13. Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1973), p.287.

14. Ibid

15. Ibid., pp 287-288

16. Hector Bolitho, p.207.

17. Ibid., p.209.

18. See, Muhammad Yusuf Saraf, pp.79-87.

19. Lawrence Ziring, "Quaid-i-Azam on the Kashmir Issue as Governor-General" in Riaz Ahmad, p.5.

20. During those days commander-in-chief, General Messervy was on leave.

21. Sir L.G. Smith the British High Commissioner in Pakistan, met the Quaid-i-Azam in Kashmir on 9 December 1947. He discussed various issue with the Quaid including the Kashmir issue. During the course of discussion the Quaid made it clear that "the most urgently important matter for decision was the form of administration to be set up in Kashmir on the cessation of hostilities. " In his report it was also mentioned that: "He repeated more than once during our conversation his belief that membership of the commonwealth should mean we right of any Dominion to claim the sympathetic interest in its troubles of other members of the family. What", he asked, "does the Commonwealth mean, if not an association of closer bonds than those existing between completely independent foreign counties? What, in short, is the value of membership of the Commonwealth, if no family gesture is made to help members in distress? Mr. Jinnah spoke on these lines at some length, "see, Sir L.G. Smith to Nobel-Baker,

9 December 1947 (received in Commonwealth Relations office on 31 December 1947), POL 12010/47 IOR L/i/i/1419, in Riaz Ahmad, p. 13.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Hector Bolitho, p.205,



## Iqbal and Muslim Universalism

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MRS. AMNA MAHMOOD

Iqbal was a great poet philosopher of the sub continent. His poetry contributed a lot in awakening of a depressed nation. He also wrote extensively in prose. His lectures on metaphysics attracted the intelligensia of the Muslims to wake up and take care of the plight of Muslim Ummah. He was essentially a poet and a political philosopher.

In the early phase of his poetry he mostly addressed the Muslims of India and tried to bring all communities of India together as a nation. But when he visited Europe, stayed there and studied European system and philosophies, his mind changed. He got the perception of great Muslim glory of the past and hollow insight of Western philosophies. A comparison of Eastern and Western philosophies disclosed the immortality of Islamic ideology, its depth and universality. This perception attributed to the fact that the Iqbal's message was for the whole Muslim world.

Ther term Muslim Universalism is used as the equivalent of Pan-Islamism, a term invented by the Western orientalis. They used it in derogatory sense for the increasing realisation of the need of unity among the Muslims. It was also used as the alternative of the term Muslim internationalism. The purpose was to awaken Muslims, remind them of their glorious past, and prepare them to launch a joint struggle against the imperialist designs of the Western powers to occupy their lands. The purpose was to restore Muslims, confidence in their own ideology and civilisation instead of getting inspiration from those of others. The period of nineteenth century was marked with the struggle for Muslim renaissance. This article studies the contribution of Iqbal in the efforts of revival of Islam as well as his ideas about the pan-Islamic movement by Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani.

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Mrs. Amna Mahmood M.Phil from Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad,  
Lecturer in Political Science Queen Mary College, Lahore

## PAN ISLAMISM

Before we analyse Iqbal's philosophical contributions to the politics of time, first we have to glance briefly at pan Islamism. The history of the Muslim world can be divided into three phases. Though the divisions are arbitrary, they can be helpful for the study of this movement.

The first period started with the first caliph after the death of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) to the eighteenth century. This period started with the glory of Islam into a great political power and ended with the downfall of Muslims dynasties. The second period started with the eighteenth century when the Muslims looked around for the revival of their political power, culture, ideology and society. This period ended with the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire at the hands of allied powers. This period witnessed a revolt against spiritual and political encroachments of the West, by the Muslim intelligentsia and the youth. The Muslim revivalists were highly impressed by Jamal-ud-Din Afghani as a pioneer of pan Islamism in Islamic World. Iqbal seems to be the main proponent of the idea of pan Islamism in this period. This period was marked with the general awakening in the masses all over the Muslim world and in the Muslim India. In the third period, which started from the 20th century, Pan Islamism was replaced by the Western concepts of nationalism. It not only divided the Muslim world forever but also ended the common struggle against the Western dominance.<sup>1</sup>

Pan Islamism was not a new concept; not the outcome of the declining Muslim civilisation, as the Western orientalist depicted it. The term was the innovation of a French journalist, used ironically as a movement in Muslim states to protect their faith against the European civilisation. The efforts to revive Muslim brotherhood and solidarity were condemned by the orientalist as fanaticism and hostility towards the West. It was also portrayed as the outcome of narrow minded Muslim orthodoxy against the Christianity and a fatal effort to start uprising against their rulers.

The enlightened Muslim intelligentsia used the term in the sense of Muslim brotherhood. It meant that all Muslims feel solidarity on the

basis of the membership of the Muslim community regardless of their nationality and race. The other aspect of the movement was that Muslims should be united again as a single entity to defend themselves against aggression.

The origin of the movement was in the rise of Islam itself when the Holy Prophet (PBUH) established a Muslim brotherhood in the city state of Madina. The first object of his teaching was to abolish all discriminations among his followers on the basis of caste, creed, tribe, birthplace, race or the economic status. The only distinction in Islam was maintained on the basis of 'piety'. Qur'an and Hadith strongly condemned the sectarianism and told that,

The Muslims are like a body. If one part is injured, the whole body suffers.<sup>2</sup>

So it was natural that Muslim sufferings in any part of the world affected others.

With the decline of political power, the whole Islamic world either came under Western rule or accepted the influence of the Western powers in their national and government affairs, by the end of nineteenth century. Algeria became a French colony in 1850. Mughal rule ended with the unsuccessful war of independence in 1857, and India became a British Colony. In 1864 Russia occupied Muslim states of Caucasus and later in 1886 Muslim states of Central Asia. Malaya and Indonesia were also subjected to alien rule. Tunisia was occupied by France and Egypt by Britain in 1881 and 1882 respectively. Later Sudan was also occupied by Britain. Bosnia, Bulgaria and other Eastern European territories were snatched away by the non-Muslim powers along with a considerable Muslim population. Afghanistan was under consistent attacks by the colonial powers. Turkey and Iran were facing conspiracies at the hands of imperialists. In fact the whole Islamic world was passing through political, religious, social and moral degeneration.<sup>3</sup>

Muslims were depressed and directionless in the wake of over Westernisation at the hands of European rulers as well as the local elite

who got educated in the west. They were losing hope and faith in their own civilisation. Fazal-ur-Renman described the plight of Muslim world as :

The unsettlement that ensued from the political defeats and subjugation rendered the Muslim psychologically less capable of constructively rethinking his heritage, and meeting the intellectual challenge of modern thought by assimilative creative processes and the christian challenge that come directly to this heritage. All these diverse elements of this whole phenomenon, therefore, have left an irresistible impression. that Islam has become internally incapable of reconstituting itself and whatever it might do by way of reconstruction, if at all it can, will be done by the influence and borrowings from the West.<sup>4</sup>

Under these circumstances Pan Islamism movement emerged as a protest in the Muslim lands. The most outstanding leader of the movement was Jamal-ud-din Afghani who organised this movement single handedly in all the Muslim countries, "with his knowledge of Sharia, gift of eloquence, vision, magnetic personality and fervent advocacy."<sup>5</sup>

He travelled extensively from Central Asia to North Africa and Europe. He stayed in different Muslim countries for a short time but he left there a group of his followers to carry on his mission. He alone managed to create awakening in the masses throughout the Muslim lands. He also visited India and stayed there for a year and a half but his impact on Indian Muslims was long lasting. They loved him like a saint.<sup>6</sup>

Jamal-ud-Din Afghani was born in 1839. There is a debate on his Irani or Afghani origin but all historians agree that he studied at various places in Persia and Afghanistan. Charles Adams wrote, "by the time he was eighteen he had studied the whole range of Muslim sciences." He studied Arabic grammar, philosophy, metaphysics, Muslim history, Muslim theology, Sufism, logic, physics, mathematics, astronomy, medicine, anatomy and various other subjects.<sup>7</sup>

Afghani preached Islamic unity and renaissance on the basis of Qur'an and Sunnah for quarter of a century. The deep influence of Afghani's movement can be traced from the writing of Sir Agha Khan.

There is a right and legitimate Pan Islamism to which every sincere and believing Muhammadan belongs that is, the theory of the spiritual brotherhood, and the unity of the children of the Prophet. It is a deep, perennial element in Perso-Arabian culture. It connotes charity and goodwill towards fellow believers everywhere from China to Morocco and from Volga to Singapore. The real spiritual and cultural unity of Islam must ever grow, for the followers of the Prophet; it is the foundation of the life of the Soul.<sup>8</sup>

Afghani strongly believed that disunity among the Muslims was the cause of the downfall of the Muslim world. He also believed that this disunity was the outcome of wilful neglect of Qur'anic principles. He preached that Muslims should abandon their localism and sectarianism for Islamic unity and brotherhood for the security of Muslim lands. They should be united to get freedom against foreign aggression and colonial rule, because under colonial rule there was no chance of their regeneration.

At the age of eighteen Afghani came to India and acquired some proficiency in English. Nikki R. Keddie wrote that traditional biographers had given only the account of the impact Afghani left on contemporary India Muslims. But she contended that the social, political and economic miseries, which Muslims had to face in post mutiny period, had deep impact on Afghani's opinion against the British colonial rule.<sup>9</sup>

Almost all the prominent Muslim leaders in the Sub-Continent were impressed by Afghani's struggle for the cause of Muslim awakening. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad paid tribute to Afghani as,

During the reform and the resurrection in the East during the nineteenth century, there is hardly a personality, which can, in natural brilliance, and creative power be compared to Syed Jamal-ud-Din. It can be unhesitatingly said that he ranks very high among the makers of history and leaders of the thought of modern East.<sup>10</sup>

Afghani's struggle for the revival of Islam was based on following basic principles.

- Unity among Muslims
- Renaissance on the basis of Qur'an and Sunnah.
- To live under alien rules was against Islam and aggression against one Muslim State was aggression against the whole Islamic world.
- Strengthening the Muslim governments to stand against imperialism.
- Reviving the tradition of Ijtihad.

Afghani devoted all his energies in reminding Muslims of their glorious past and the misery into which they were sinkir.👉 In an article published in the first issue of *Urwahtul Wusqa*<sup>11</sup> he described his observation about the contemporary state of affairs in the East.

The Eastern people are being subjected to extreme tyranny and high handedness by the West. Most of them are passing through the worst stages of their history. Especially the Muslims have been treated in an extremely shabby manner. Princes have been dethroned by force, and the aristocracy has been deprived of its privileges.<sup>12</sup>

The main cause was the lack of devotion to the common cause. In the same article he pointed out that "nefarious activities of selfish people have obstructed the progress of Islam and that of Muslims, Islam is the only nationality." It means that in Afghani's thought the territorial concept of nationality was considered unIslamic. He further said, "The fact is beyond any doubt that respect of Muslim countries depends upon their mutual trust and harmony which is an integral part of Islamic Law, and should be the foremost article of Muslim faith."<sup>13</sup> Professor Brown commented in his book on Afghani saying that,

Enormous force of character, prodigious learning, untiring activity, dauntless courage, extraordinary eloquence both in writing, and an appearance equally striking and majestic, he was at once a philosopher, writer, orator, and journalist, but above all a politician, and was regarded by his admirers as a great patriot and by his antagonists as a dangerous agitator.<sup>14</sup>

### IQBAL'S VIEW

Iqbal's era of intellectual and poetic maturity inaugurated at a time when the Pan-Islamic movement had already created awakening in the Muslim countries. After his initial passion for Hindi nationalism, Iqbal turned to his origin as a Muslim. He became an ardent Muslim universalist abandoning his earlier idea of territorial nationalism. It was not a contradiction in his thought but it was a process of evolution.

Iqbal's wholehearted advocacy of looking back to Qur'an as a complete code of life, his concept of Muslim unity manifested in "Millat" and his hatred for Western imperialism were the concepts, which were also at the centre of Afghani's thought. A deep insight of Afghani and Iqbal reveals that the movement, which was, started by Afghani, attained its high mark in Iqbal's thought. Though some scholars had controversial views about Afghani<sup>15</sup> but Iqbal had a great respect for him. In a letter to Mohammad Ahsan, he wrote,

In modern times from any point of view, if any body is entitled to be called a Mujaddid, it is Jamal-ud-Din Afghani. The future historians of the Muslims of the Egypt, Iran, Turkey and India will first of all mention the name of Abdul Wahab Najdi and after that of Jamal-ud-Din Afghani. In fact the latter is the chief architect of the present day renaissance in the Muslim world. If the Muslim nation has not declared him a Mujaddid, or if he has not claimed that title for himself, that in no way reduces his status in the minds of those who have a proper insight into the matter.<sup>16</sup>

Iqbal paid homage to Afghani as a chief exponent of the cause of Islam in the modern world. He had devoted a great deal of thought to the exposition of Afghani's idea in his book.

*Javid Nama.*

گفت مشرق زیں دوکس نزاو تاخن شاں عقیدہ ہائے ماکشاد  
سید السادات مولانا جمال زندہ اؤگتار اوسنگ و سغال 17

In a reply to a question raised by Pundit Jawaherlal Nehru, Iqbal expressed his gratitude to Afghani in the following words,

Maulana Jamal-ud-Din Afgani was a man of different stamp. Strange are the ways of providence. One of the most advance Muslims of our time, both in religious thought and action...A perfect master of nearly all the Muslim languages of the world and endowed with most winning eloquence, his restless soul migrated from one Muslim country to another, influencing some of the most prominent Muslims in Iran, Egypt and Turkey. Some of the greatest theologians of our time, such as Mufti Mohammad Abdohu, and some of the men of younger generation who later became political leaders, such as Zaghlul Pasha of Egypt, were his disciples. He wrote little, spoke much and thereby transformed into miniature Jamal-ud-Dins all those who came into contact with him. He never claimed to be a prophet or renewer ; yet no man in our time has stirred the soul of Islam more deeply than he. His spirit is still working in the world of Islam and nobody knows where it will end.<sup>18</sup>

Iqbal himself was a strong proponent of Muslim universalism. His non-Muslim critics used the title pan-Islamist in a derogatory sense for him. But he was fully convinced that if the Muslims had to survive as a nation they must be united. In his address to Muhammadan Educational Conference in 1911, he reiterated,



Some unkind critics, while commenting on my poems had labeled me as an advocate of the Pans-Islamic movement, I proclaim myself openly a Pan-Islamist, and it is my conviction that our nation has a glorious future.<sup>19</sup>

### MILLAT

In the early period of his poetry Iqbal believed in the unity of Hindu and Muslim communities of India. This period was the revelation of his nationalist ideas on the basis of his Hindi origin. His poems like *Himala*, *Taranal-I-Hindu* and *Naya Shiwala* showed the sentiments of a staunch nationalist.<sup>20</sup> His *Tarana-I-Hindi* was loved as a national anthem by majority of Indian communities.<sup>21</sup>

ہم بلہلیں ہیں اس کی یہ گلستان ہمارا	سارے جہاں سے اچھا ہندوستان ہمارا
بندی ہیں ہم وطن ہے ہندوستان ہمارا	نہیب نہیں سکھاتا آپس میں بیر رکھنا
اب تک مگر ہے باقی نام و نشان ہمارا <sup>22</sup>	یونان و مصر روم سب مٹ گئے جہاں سے

But even then his relations with the rest of the Muslim world was an integral part of his thoughts.

کہ مہرت خیز ہے حیرا فسانہ سب فسائوں میں	دلاتا ہے ترا نظارہ اے ہندوستان! مجھ کو
تری بر باد یوں کے مشورے ہیں آسمانوں میں	وطن کی فکر کرنا داں! مصیبت آنے والی ہے
تمہاری داستاں تک بھی نہ ہوگی داستاںوں میں	نہ سمجھو گے تو مٹ جاؤ گے اے ہندوستان والو!
جو مشکل ہے تو اس مشکل کو آساں کر کے چھوڑوں گا	پروتا ایک ہی تسبیح میں ان بکھرے دانوں کو
مرے اہل وطن کے دل میں کچھ فکر وطن بھی ہے <sup>23</sup>	اجازا ہے تمیز ملت و آئیں نے قوموں کو

Iqbal went to Europe and studied different philosophies of the modern world. He drew the conclusion that not a single philosophy or the ism had the potential to solve the problems of humanity. He was able to extract from the study of Western civilisation that the land, race and

language could not provide a firm ideology for a nation. Only religion could fulfil this requirement. Iqbal criticised the whole ideological structure of Western nationalism. He realised that the enlightenment of Europe and the glory of its civilisation were merely pomp and show and it was going to collapse at any time.

دائے تمنائے خام اوائے تمنائے خام 24  
 ذہنوں رہا ہے فرنگِ عیشِ جہاں کا دوام  
 کہ روح اس مدنیت کی رو سکی نہ تحصیل  
 فسادِ قلب و نظر ہے فرنگ کی تہذیب  
 ضمیر پاک و خیال بلند و ذوق لطیف 25  
 رہے نہ روح میں پاکیزگی تو ہے ناپید

Iqbal was against the Western concept of nationhood. His criticism of nationalism was based on moral, spiritual and political factors. The prejudices of Hindu politics strengthened his ideas. Hindu agitation for the annulment of the partition of Bengal might be quoted as one incidence, which compelled him to see Indian political scene as a Muslim, not as an Indian. He wrote,

Nationalism in the sense of love of one's country and even readiness to die for its honour, is a part of Muslim faith: it comes into conflict with Islam only when it begins to play the role of a political concept, and claims to be a principle of human solidarity demanding that Islam should recede to the background of a mere private opinion and cease to be a living factor in the national life.<sup>26</sup>

Iqbal was strongly convinced that the loyalty demanded by the Western concept of nation could only be attributed to religion. Like Afghani he also declared the territorial basis of nationality as unIslamic.

اپنی ملت پہ قیاسِ اقوامِ مغرب سے نہ کر  
 خاص ہے ترکیب میں قومِ رسولِ ہائمی  
 ان کی جمعیت کا ہے ملک و نسب پر انحصار  
 قوتِ مذہب سے مستحکم ہے جمعیتِ تری  
 دامن دیں ہاتھ سے چھوٹا تو جمعیت کہاں  
 اور جمعیت ہوئی رخصت تو ملت بھی گئی 27

## MUSLIM UNITY

The first decade of twentieth century was marked with great turmoil in international politics. European powers were involved in struggle for the achievement of their national ambitions. Iqbal had witnessed industrial, military and colonial enmities for the sake of national glory, which ultimately created major upheavals in the world history.<sup>28</sup>

Italy's attack on Tripoli (1911) and the Balkan Wars (1912-13) were a shock for the Islamic world. The policies of Britain, which led to the disintegration of Ottoman Empire into small independent states, created great resentment in the Muslims of India. These small Muslim states were easy pray for the European imperialism. In an article on the issue Iqbal wrote,

Very early from the writings of the European scholars I had come to know that the basic scheme of Western imperialism was to dismember the unity of the Muslim world by popularising territorial nationalism among its various components,<sup>29</sup>

Iqbal wrote some of the most beautiful poems on his anti-imperialist on Muslim universalism. The poem Sicily is the reflection of the feelings Iqbal had, for the glory of the past when the Muslims were the world leaders. He looked with grief at the deplorable conditions of the Island and described it as the graveyed of Islamic culture. This glory is now beyond reclamation.

وہ نظر آتا ہے تہذیبِ حجازی کا مزار	روئے اب دل کھول کر اسے دیدہ خونناہ پار
بجرِ ہزاری گاہ تھا جن کے سفینوں کا کبھی	تھا یہاں ہنگامہ اب صحرا نشینوں کا کبھی
بجلیوں کے آشیانے جن کی کھواروں میں تھے <sup>30</sup>	ز لرے جن سے شہنشاہوں کے درباروں میں تھے

Iqbal like Afghani reminded Muslims of their glorious past and convinced them to be united. To both of them it was the only way to change the fate of the Muslim world. Afghani had the perception that disunity of the Muslim world and its division in small insecure states made it possible for the imperialist powers to occupy all the Muslim lands one after another, Iqbal expressed this idea in his poem *Dunai Islam*.

کیا سنا تا ہے مجھے ترک و عرب کی داستان	مجھ سے کچھ پنہاں نہیں اسلاموں کا سوز و ساز
ہو گئی رسوا زمانے میں کلاہ لالہ رنگ	جو سراپا ناز تھے ہیں آج مجبور بے نیاز
حکمت مغرب سے ملت کی یہ کیفیت ہوئی	نکلے نکلے جس طرح سونے کو کر دیتا ہے گاز
ہو گیا مانند آب ارزاں مسلمان کا لبو	مضطرب ہے تو کہ تیرا دل نہیں دانائے راز
رہا و ملت بیضا ہے مشرق کی نجات	ایشیا والے ہیں اس نکتے سے اب تک بے خبر <sup>31</sup>

His concept of the unity of Ummah was manifested in his idea of Millat. He advised his nation to leave all distinctions in the name of caste, creed, race and lands.

یوں تو سید بھی ہو، مرزا بھی ہو، افغان بھی ہو  
تم سبھی کچھ ہو بتاؤ تو مسلمان بھی ہو<sup>32</sup>

Iqbal warned his nation to be aware of the colonial designs of the European powers and restore the state of brotherhood established by the Holy Prophet (PBUH).

قوم مذہب سے ہے مذہب جو نہیں تم بھی نہیں  
مذہب باہم جو نہیں، محفل انجم بھی نہیں<sup>33</sup>

Both Iqbal and Afghani addressed the Muslim youth. They saw their potential as a fresh blood for the Pan-Islamism. Iqbal recalled the glory of the past and awoke the Muslims. He described the downfall of the Muslims in the words,

کبھی اے نوجوانوں مسلم! تہر بھی کیا تو نے؟  
وہ کیا گردوں تھا، تو جس کا ہے اک ٹونا ہوا تارا  
گنوا دی ہم نے جو اسلاف سے میراث پائی تھی  
ثریا سے زمین پہ آسماں نے ہم کو دے مارا<sup>34</sup>

In his poem *Jawab I Shikwa* he expressed the hope that if Muslims were able to unite, eliminate all racial discriminations, follow Islam in the real sense and launch a joint struggle against their enemies, they would be blessed again,

اپنی اصلیت سے آگاہ ہو اے غافل کہ تو      قطرہ ہے لیکن مثال بحر بے پاں بھی ہے  
 منفعت ایک ہے اس قوم کی نقصان بھی ایک      ایک ہی سب کا نبی، دین بھی، ایمان بھی ایک  
 حرم پاک بھی، اللہ بھی، قرآن بھی ایک      کچھ بڑی بات تھی ہوتے جو مسلمان بھی ایک  
 فرقہ بندی ہے کہیں اور کہیں ذاتیں ہیں      کیا زمانے میں پھیننے کی یہی باتیں ہیں<sup>35</sup>

### IJTIHAD

Both Iqbal and Afghani had firm belief that reform movement in Islam should be strictly based on the Principles of Qur'an and Sunnah. They believed that this downfall was due to the weakness of Islamic character of the Muslims. Iqbal had given this message in his poetry. He was convinced that Islam made no distinction between church and state.

جلال بادشاہی ہو کہ جمہوری تماشا  
 جدا ہو دیں سیاست سے تو رہ جاتی ہے چنگیزی<sup>36</sup>

He also believed that Islam is a complete code of life and the only solution to Muslim problems rested in obedience to God and Prophet (PBUH).

لگاؤ عشق و مستی میں وہی اول وہی آخر  
 وہی خدا، قرآن، وہی فرقاں، وہی بسیں وہی ط<sup>37</sup>

According to him Muslim ideology had eternal ability to protect its followers provided they devote themselves to the spirit of Islam. He says,

کس درجہ یہاں عام ہوئی مرگِ تحفیل      ہندی بھی فرنگی کا مقلدِ عجمی بھی  
مجھ کو تو یہی غم ہے کہ اس دور کے ہنراد      کھو بیٹھے ہیں مشرق کا سرورازنی بھی 38

In his poems Shikwa and Jawab I Shikwa he discusses the reasons of the contemporary Muslim sufferings and concluded that it was all due to their deviation from their religion.

وہ زمانے میں معزز تھے مسلمان ہو کر  
اور تم خوار ہوئے تبارکِ قرآن ہو کر 39

Iqbal warned his nation to be aware of the colonial designs of the European powers and restore the state of brotherhood established by the Holy prophet (PBUH). Iqbal believed that the major cause of increasing sectarianism in Ummah was the stagnation in Islam. It was not due to any fault in Islam as a system but it was due to the negligence of ulama. The closure of the institution of Ijtihad by the Abbasids ended the ability of the Islamic law to deal with the contemporary problems of the Muslim world. It was against the traditions of pious caliphs. One of the by-products of this stagnation was the mushroom growth of sects in Ummah.

Afghani suggested that Muslim ulama should be organised in their region and guide people in the light of Qur'an and Sunnah. All the regional centres should be attached to a centre, which would be at Makkah. He also proposed that there should be regular conferences of Muslim ulamah representing their regions to discuss the current issues and their reasoning. In this way consensus on different confronting issues was possible which would ultimately promote unity of Ummah. Afghani wanted to use this unity to defend Islamic world against foreign aggression.<sup>40</sup>

Iqbal also considered Ijtihad as an instrument of change, a movement towards progress and an inevitable link between permanent attributes of Islam and fast changing life. He emphasised the need of stability in the modern age. In his book *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Iqbal defines Ijtihad as "the principle of movement in the structure of Islam."<sup>41</sup> Responding to Ijtihad of Turkish Grand Assembly, he saw a legislative assembly entitled to conduct Ijtihad in the form of Ijma.<sup>42</sup>

Both Iqbal and Afghani showed strong reservations against Mullaism, pseudo mysticism and false preaching of monastic quietism. In Iqbal's writings 'Mullaism' is a symbol of decay and a source of degeneration of Islam into heathenism. In a letter to Pundit Nehru, he expressed his views on Mullaism, mysticism and monarchy.

The ulama have always been a source of great strength to Islam. But during the course of centuries, especially since the destruction of Baghdad, they became extremely conservative and would not allow any freedom of Ijtihad i.e. the forming of independent judgement in the matters of law. The Wahabi Movement, which was a source of inspiration to the nineteenth century Muslim reformers, was really a revolt against the rigidity of ulama. Thus the first objective of nineteenth century Muslim reformers was a fresh orientation of the faith and a freedom to reinterpret the law in the light of advancing experience.<sup>43</sup>

## CALIPHATE

Afghani was deadly against the scattered and independent small states, which were either captured by European imperialists, or their governments were acting as puppets in the hands of foreign advisors. He was looking for a central leadership for Muslims. Most of the leaders of middle class Muslim in India had accepted the claim of Sultan of Turkey as a Caliph of Islam.<sup>44</sup> Sultan Abdul Aziz was the first to become a symbol of Muslim unity for Indian Muslims.

Afghani was distrustful of Sultan Abdul Hameed. He intended to take political advantage from the Pan Islamic movement and Caliphate movement. While Afghani, as an idealist wanted to use these movements for the unity of Ummah and their collective security. This chapter closed with the death of Afghani in 1897.<sup>45</sup>

Iqbal was also in favour of some central force for Ummah. He was secretary of Caliphate committee. But after the termination of Caliphate at the hands of Grand National Assembly, Iqbal derived the idea that Caliphate could be attributed to a group of people or a parliament instead of a single person. He agreed with the idea of Zia Pasha that international Islamic state under one Caliphate could be an ideal when all the Muslim states got freedom from alien rule. Until then they should struggle to get them selves liberated.<sup>46</sup>

Both Jamal-ud-Din Afghani and Iqbal never demanded the political Pan Islamism in the form of unification of Muslims into a single state. Iqbal indicated that "Muslims are tied by belief, history, outlook on life here and hereafter, and a common way of looking at what is good and what is bad in thought and conduct. This phenomenon brings the believers of the world into a common fold of eternal values. He was however hopeful that through some process of Ijtihad, the Muslim states would enter into a sort of federation or a league of nations. But he postponed the pious wish to the next generation after the independence of the Muslim states. This also shows that Iqbal's concept of Millat and Muslim universalism had the same meanings.

He was aware of the painful reality that Muslims engulfed with parochial affinities would never be able to join hands for a common cause against their common enemies. Under these circumstances it would be impossible for all the Muslim nations to join a supra national state. He was also convinced that the contemporary indifference to the cause of Ummah was the outcome of over Westernisation. This phenomenon caused the territorial labels and warned Muslims against the love for parochial barriers to the detriments of universalism. He proposed the commonwealth of Muslim states or the league of Muslim nations to



preserve the unity of Muslim Ummah. He also accepted Afghani's perception that Makkah should be the centre of Muslim brotherhood.

تو اگر داری تمیز خوب دزشت      دل نہ بندی پاکو بخ و سنگ و خشت  
صیبت دین بر خاشن از روے خاک      تازہ خود آگہ گردو جاں پاک 48

### CONCLUSION

The concepts of Islamic unity, universalism, and return to Qur'an and Sunnah were the attributes of the movement led by Jamal-uddin Afghani for the revival of Islam. Iqbal's idea of Muslim Millat, its universality and call for a joint struggle to liberate Muslim lands from the clutches of imperialism was the continuity of Afghani's movement. It was a reform movement using Islam as a complete code of life, to cure the ills of Muslim society and restore their political power and independence. It was not against any other nation. If the Muslim leaders like Afghani and Iqbal and others supported unity of Muslim Ummah to defend their civilisation from Western intellectual and political invasion, there was no harm in it. Every nation has the right to defend its identity, culture, religion and political and geographical borders. So the Muslim intellectuals did. The negative propaganda against this movement was a part of imperialist designs of the West.

باطل کے خال و فرکی حفاظت کے واسطے      یورپ زدہ میں ڈوب گیا دوش تا کر  
ہم پوچھتے ہیں شیخ کھسیا نواز سے      مشرق میں جنگ شر ہے تو مغرب میں بھی ہے شر  
حق سے اگر غرض ہے تو زیبا ہے کیا یہ بات      اسلام کا محاسبہ، یورپ سے در گذر 49

The Western influence damaged Muslims solidarity and brotherhood as established by the Holy Prophets himself. It had been a historical fact that the Muslims used to move freely from one Muslim state to another. They were free to settle in any of the Muslim countries and even rose to

the eminent positions in local government as first rate citizens. The fall of the Muslim lands to the European colonial status was a severe blow to this tradition.

They first imposed restrictions and then put a lid on free movement. The decline from independent status caused a decline in the sense of Islamic solidarity and nationhood. It also affected the doctrine of Muslim universality, which meant the spiritual and political ascendancy of Caliph in Muslim dynasty. This principle could never be restored, despite a great concern for the Caliphate among the Muslim masses.

This European rule promoted and ultimately established the notion of nationalism in the Western sense, Pan Islamism was abolished and replaced by nationalism. Turkey was the first to take this stand. Later all the Muslim countries struggled against the colonial rule to win their independence. But their independence could not revive the old characteristics of Muslim brotherhood.

Afghani, Sheikh Abdohu, and Iqbal preached both political and religious aspects of Pan Islamism and his commitment remained alive till his last breath. After the adoption of western concept of territorial nationalism the political aspect of this movement lost its relevance. But its reforming aspect remained active.

Iqbal in his presidential address in Allahabad said,

At critical moments in history, it is Islam that has saved and not vice versa. If today you focus your vision on Islam and seek inspiration from the ever vitalising ideas embodied in it, you will be only reassembling your scattered forces, regaining your lost integrity and thereby saving yourself from total destruction.<sup>50</sup>

Practically speaking Pan Islamism has more relevance in the present scenario. Muslim solidarity and cooperation are the need of the time. In fact the potential emergence of Islam as a political power lies in the fact that Muslims have a strong, practicable ideology for all times. Though Muslim universalism is not possible in the foreseeable future but a close cooperation and effective policy stands to safeguard the interests of Muslim Ummah from the platform of OIC can serve as a good start towards Muslim brotherhood, which is the basis of Islam.

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# Iqbal's Nationalism and Contemporary Muslim World

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DR. G. SARWAR KHAN

## INTRODUCTION

Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), was both a great poet and serious thinker. He had many ideas that occupied various position along the spectrum on the philosophic, social and political plain. His ideas are dynamic and romantic, provocative and profound; which can serve as a beacon for the Muslim community as well as for the humanity. He had denounced Western brand of nationalism and advanced the case of pan-Islamism in line with Jamal-ud-din Afghani and world Muslim unity. He had criticized the West for its materialism, for the cut-throat competition and for its values while applauding the East for its spiritualism and its concern for the soul; and condemned capitalism while preaching "a kind of vague socialism."<sup>1</sup> Iqbal's early nationalism replaced by the pan-Islamism is his thirst for Muslim unity. He believed that as a unifying force Islam supersedes national, ethnic and racial differences. Degeneration of Muslims was his real concern which, according to him, must be cured through action. Contemporary Muslim world also faces the same kind of problems that Iqbal grappled throughout his intellectual life. It is imperative to refocus our attention on the problem of degeneration of Muslim *Ummah*, and to find effective ways and means to achieve Muslim unity in order to meet the challenges faced by the Muslim world in the present uni-polar world. This paper focuses on some philosophical aspects of Iqbal's nationalism and pan-Islamism and its conceptual relevance in the contemporary Muslim world.

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Dr. G. Sarwar Khan, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Islamia University, Bahawalpur, Pakistan.

Nationalism was among the modern concepts that attracted most of the Iqbal's attention. In his poetry, speeches, statements and letters he often expressed his opinion on many facts of this issue. Certainly there is some evidence to show a change in his out-looks from a fervent nationalist of the Western type in a university of the Islamic pattern. Without attempting to identify the numerous currents and cross currents of his political thought, one may still pinpoint three important benchmarks, each representing a distinct phase and philosophy, but not merging into the other. For the sake of convenience, these may be termed as the nationalistic, pan-Islamic and Muslim nationalism or Muslim universalism. For example some of the poems in Bang-i-Dara show him a poet of Indian nationalism. In this phase, he was profoundly influenced by the spirit of nationalism abroad, and uttered the feelings of the patriotism. Tirana-i-Hindi and Naya Shiwala are trilogy to be pointed out. Iqbal considered India superior to the rest of the world. Iqbal lauds India to the high skies, putting her on a pedestal higher than Greek, Egypt and Room, the chief citadels of ancient civilization.<sup>2</sup> After eulogizing certain aspects of the land he inculcate communal harmony, by saying that: "No religion preaches hatred and that everybody living in the country is Indian and India is his land."<sup>3</sup>

To be hostile to one another  
Religion teaches not!  
Indians are all well,  
and Hindustan our country,

مذہب نہیں سکھاتا آپس میں ہر رکھنا  
ہندی ہیں ہم وطن ہے سارا جہاں ہمارا

His later poems, particularly after the European inroads into the Muslim world and rise of nationalist movements in the Middle East, have a very striking pan-Islamic touch. This change in attitude made Iqbal a leading scholar-philosopher of Islam.

This phase came to an abrupt end after Iqbal's visit to Europe (1905-1908). After 1908 Iqbal was thoroughly convinced that Nationalism is "Poisonous for the modern civilization of man; and it is particularly so in the case of Muslims because it is contrary to the fundamentals of their faith."<sup>4</sup> It appears that Iqbal's understanding about this issue was much

deeper and more in consonance with the Quran and *Sunnah* than that of his opponents. He thought nationalism divided men from their fellow men and nations from nations. He believed that as a unifying force, Islam supersedes national, ethnic and racial differences. That means universal oneness of the Muslims regardless of geographical distances and racial disparities. Because of his profound knowledge of Western philosophy, his initiation into modern Western thought and his close contact with Western life proved a stimulating factor in the maturity of his thoughts rather than to have acted as a catalyst, enabling him to perceive things in wider perspective and in clearer terms. Due to his fruitful personal experience by living in Europe and studying its history and philosophy, Iqbal could easily visualize that the onward march of nationalism had actually bred racialism in many countries. Thus, Turks, the Egyptians, Iranians and the Arabs had laid emphasize on the unique and particular racial origins and their racial differences from each other, in order to build up their own separate nationalistic states under the impact of nationalism. That had undermined the Islamic concept of Ummah, enfeebling the Muslim world, and in consequence, laying it all the more open to the Western designs, aggression, and exploitation. In reply to a statement of Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madni, he said :

"I have been repudiating the concept of Nationalism since the time when it was not known in India and the Muslim World. At the very start it had become clear to me from the writings of European authors that the imperialistic designs of Europe were in great need of this effective weapon- the propagation of the European conception of nationalism in Muslim countries to shatter the religious unity of Islam to piece."<sup>5</sup>

*Millat* (community), according to Iqbal, is not circumscribed by territorial limitations. A Muslim does not belong to India, Rome or Syria, Islam is his destiny. In otherwords, the *Millat* (community) demands unity of hearts and belief rather than that of race or territory.<sup>6</sup> Iqbal believed that regeneration of Muslims is only possible in holding Muslims together in pan-Islamism. His concept of *Millat* was basically pan-Islamic. Pan-Islamic movement was started by Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani (1839-96) that was culminated in his message.

Despite the march of history in the previous two or three decades, driving the Muslims on back seat, the Afghani legacy still dominated the Muslims mind to the point of becoming its magnificent obsession.<sup>7</sup> This was particularly true of Indian Muslims as evidenced by their reaction to the unprovoked Italian raid on Tripoli (1911), the Balkan war (1912-14) and the still later Khilafat question (1918-24).<sup>8</sup> Iqbal certainly was the great admirer of Afghani and advancing the cause of Afghani.<sup>9</sup> As keen observer of Muslim affairs, Iqbal, like Afghani, suggested the Pan-Islamic ideal in response to a desperate situation confronting the Muslim world. Post-war events rivened the Muslim world. The Credo of the young Turks, the revolt of Sharif Hussain of Makkah (1916), the sykes-Picot pact (1916) stipulating the division of conquered Ottoman territories among the victorious Allied powers, the iniquitous Balfour Declaration of 2 November, 1917 establishing a "national home" for the Jews in Palestine, and the earlier (1907-9) strangulation of the Persian constitution, all these events portended that Muslim people, now isolated from one another, had become a convenient target of Western designs, which had questioned the universality of Islam itself. Hence, Iqbal lamented Muslims for becoming race-conscious and race-oriented and exhorted to build up a single Millat or Ummah. The message to Muslims was conveyed, in his poetry, to unite for the defence of Baitul haram from the banks of the Nile to the frontiers of Kashaghar.

From the banks of the Nile	
To the soil of Kashaghar	ایک ہوں مسلم حرم کی پاسبانی کے لیے
The Muslims should be united	نیل کے ساحل سے لیکر تا بخاک کا شاعر
For the protection of their sanctuary <sup>10</sup>	

Iqbal believes in the universality of the *Millat* (Muslim Community). The basis of such a community is the common belief in *Tauheed* (Unity of God) and *Risaalat* (Prophethood of Muhammad (peace be upon him) which constitute a separate entity in the comity of nations.<sup>11</sup> He had denounced the concept of *wamiyat* (nationalism) which, he felt, had divided Muslims and riven the Muslim world. Nationalism and pan-Islamism are competing ideologies the one founded on the communality



of race, language and territory, and the other on the common legacy of a universal religion, and a cosmopolitan culture.

Neither is our heart  
Of India, or Syria or Rome,  
Nor any father-land do we profess  
Except Islam<sup>12</sup>

قلب ما از هند و روم و شام نیست  
مرز ایم اوربجز اسلام نیست

These are not two ends of a continuum, but are based on dichotomy, Hence, it is argued, that Iqbal's abandonment of nationalism for pan-Islamism represents a radical shift in his position, and not an evolution of thought. To many observers Iqbal's undiminished zest for a pan-Islamic society is just an ideal. But according to Iqbal himself, the ideal and the real are not two opposite forces, which defy conciliation. Idealism does not mean a complete break with realism. In fact, it is his perpetual endeavor to bring the ideal appropriately closer to the real.<sup>13</sup> Being a keen observer of Muslim affairs world-over, he could not have escaped perceiving the harsh fact that his pancea of pan-Islamism in its idealistic classical form was not practicable or relevant in the Muslim world of the twenties. It was a harsh reality that several Muslim countries had opted for nationalism for politics based on asabiyat- i.e., racial and linguistic unity and were seeking nationalist solutions to their problems, Nationalism now, as a ground reality in almost all the Muslim countries, with territorial frontiers constituting an integral part of the basis of nationhood in Muslim countries in the post-war era.<sup>14</sup>

Being a visionary futuristic, Iqbal could not have possibly ignored all these historical facts, and was going to reconcile his ideal with the realism. In a reply to Sir Fazal-I-Hussain, on his remarks in Council of State that political pan-Islamism never existed in Islamic history, he said:

Sir Fazl-I-Hussain is perfectly correct when he says that political pan-Islamism never existed. It has existed if at all, only in the imagination of those who invented the phrase or possibly as a diplomatic weapon in the hands of Sultan Abdul Hameed Khan of Turkey. Even Jamal-ud-Din Afghani whose name is closely associated with what is called pan-Islamic movement, never dreamed of a unification of Muslims into a political state.<sup>15</sup>

In his Allahabad address (1930) in League session, Iqbal clearly told the audience :

One cannot ignore facts however unpleasant they may be. The only practical course is not to assume the existence of a state of things, which does not exist, but to recognize facts as they are, and to exploit them to our greatest advantage.<sup>16</sup>

Hence, Iqbal tried to resolve the conflict between nationalism, the facts of life and pan-Islamism, the ideal towards which he would like to see the Muslim people strive. He was convinced that the universality of Islam was vital to the faith itself and the Muslim people remain firmly anchored to their dynamic Islamic legacy and heritage.<sup>17</sup> He firmly believed that if the Muslim nations were to survive in the competitive world, they must find out some device, which could again link them together as one compact entity. Thus, Iqbal like Afghani, arrived at the concept of 'Islamic'; but more accurately, 'Muslim universalism'.<sup>18</sup> Afghani, while preaching and working for pan-Islamism had also supported local nationalism wherever he found them to fit in within the broad framework of his ultimate goals.<sup>19</sup>

Iqbal, it may be argued, had reconciled himself to the prevailing concept of nationalism followed by most of the Muslim world, if only because he found that: "no non-Muslim group has cut across a Muslim society for a nationalist one."<sup>20</sup> To quote Professor Wilfred Cantwell Smith:

--... Wherever nationalism has been adopted in the Muslim world, and in whatever form, the 'nation' concerned has been a Muslim group. No Muslim people has evolved a national feeling that has meant a loyalty to or even concern for a community transcending the bonds of Islam.<sup>21</sup>

--... Muslim groups differ as to the degree to which the Islamic interplay with nationalism is overt and explicit. They do not differ in the fact that every where their nationalisms are enthusiasm for Muslim nations.<sup>22</sup>

Professor Smith further remarks,<sup>23</sup>

—... The driving force of nationalism has become more and more religious, the more the movement has penetrated the masses. Even where the leaders and the form and the ideas of the movement have been nationalist on a more or less Western pattern, the followers and the substance and the emotions were significantly Islamic.

Iqbal was quite satisfied with the positive developments in various Muslim countries that was not going to cut across the Muslim nationalism. India was the test case for Muslims giving allegiance to a predominantly non-Islamic nationalism. Hence, for a while, the Muslims generally "gave themselves with zeal" to a composite Hindu/Muslim, Indian nationalism.... Presently collapsed in shreds so far as the general Muslim group was concerned."<sup>24</sup> This development undermined, among others, one basic fact of Muslims vis-à-vis nationalism: "a non-Islamic nationalism could not, for Muslims, stand against them."<sup>25</sup> The Indian experiment also testified that "the appeal to the Muslim group for loyalty to a society other than its own religious one"<sup>26</sup> was bound to fail sooner or later.<sup>27</sup>

Iqbal, it may be urged, seems to be a pragmatic after dramatic developments in the Muslim world after World War-I. Nationalist movements in various countries—in Turkey, in Iran, in Egypt, and elsewhere – provided at that time only means for getting rid of foreign domination or for successfully withstanding Western designs, as well as for rehabilitating mundane Islam in these countries. It is construed, that nationalist experiments in various Muslim Countries, notably in Turkey, there seems to be a radical shift in his ideas accordingly, which considered his contradictions by some scholars.<sup>28</sup> On the one hand Iqbal had bemoaned the abolition of the Caliphate with the verse: Lo! The unthinking Turks have torn as under the mantle of *Khilafat*,"<sup>29</sup> on the other hand, five years later, he defended Mustafa Kamal Atatürk's (1880-1938) precipitate an extremely controversial decision.<sup>30</sup> More importantly he considered 'perfectly sound' the decision of Turkey's *ijtihad* in vesting in Grand Assembly an elected body. If the one represented to anguished cry of a pan-Islamist, the other represented the

enthusiastic defence of a nationalist venture by the leader of a single Muslim country in a matter intrinsically Islamic without consulting rather in complete disregard of the consensus of the rest of the Muslim world.<sup>31</sup> This indicates Iqbal's radical shift from his pristine pan-Islamic stance and orientation.

Iqbal was convinced that Muslim world despite its imperative need to find nationalist solutions to their desperate problems could maintain some sort of unity among themselves. Following Zia Gokalp, the chief theoretician of Turkish nationalism, he advocated multi-nationalism with a view, ofcourse, to energizing Muslims and rehabilitating Islam.

For the present, every Muslim nation must sink into her deeper self, temporarily focus her vision on her-self alone, until all are strong and powerful to form a living family of republics. A true and living unity, according to the nationalist thinkers, is not so easy to be achieved by a merely symbolical overlordship. It is truly manifested in a multiplicity of the independent units whose racial rivalries are adjusted and harmonized by the unifying bond of a common spiritual aspiration. Its seems to me that Islam is neither Nationalism nor Imperialism, but a League of Nations which recognizes artificial boundaries and racial distinctions for facility of reference only, and not for restricting the social horizon of its members.<sup>32</sup>

Post-war developments in the Muslim world created artificial boundaries and racial distinction, yet Iqbal wanted to make sure that they should not be allowed to restrict the social horizon of Muslims. As long as their horizon was based on Islam, there was every hope that nationalism would turn into an enthusiasm for Islam, that ethos would remain essentially Islamic, and that the door for cooperation between various Muslim countries would remain wide open. Thus, the inherent conflict in the nationalism—pan-Islamic dichotomy was resolved through the formulation of a synthetic concept of 'Muslim universalism'. This crucial difference made others as nationalist while making Iqbal basically pan-Islamic.<sup>33</sup> The structural apprentices and format are cast in the nationalist framework, the ethos are inspired by Islam. It is a translation, on the political plane, of Iqbal's self-perception of his own message.

What—if my goblet is non-Arab?  
 Its contents are Hijazi, after all!  
 What—if my lyric is Indian?  
 Its rhythm is Hijazi, after all!<sup>34</sup>

جہی شہ ہے تو کیا ہے تو حجازی ہے مری  
 نغمہ بندی ہے تو کیا کے تو حجازی ہے مری

On this analogy, he laid the intellectual foundations of Muslim nationalism in India and demanded "the creation of autonomous States" on the basis of "unity of language, race, history, religion, and identity of economic interests."<sup>35</sup> These were the attributes of nationalism that justified viable territorial frontiers (and territorial unity) to be incorporated among the basis of "Pakistan"<sup>36</sup> demand, religion was to be the leading factor. However, the consequences were to be spelled out in essentially Islamic terms. Thus, Iqbal laid the intellectual foundation of Muslim nationalism in India, and envisioned the Muslim India a destiny. What was remarkable about it was that while being congruent with the ideological legacy of Indian Islam, it provided a viable and constructive answer to Muslim India's current problems and predilections.

One of the underlying theme in Iqbal's thought and action throughout the whole span of his active life that held together his thoughts and ideas, although diversified they were, rehabilitation of Muslims in the contemporary world. He believed that the regeneration of Muslims could not be accomplished within an Islamic framework, nor could it be brought about without an Islamic resurgence.<sup>37</sup>

## II

Now, in the light of Iqbal's conceptual framework of "Muslim universalism, what is the true picture in the contemporary Muslim world? Notwithstanding political unity, how much social unity between the Muslim countries and their people is there? Unfortunately there is a sorry state of affairs, while looking into the contemporary Muslim world on the International political scenario, in terms of their material as well as spiritual progress and taking into account of their unity. It is an imperative need to reawaken the Muslim world to undertake long overdue "reconstruction of religious thought" to produce a blueprint for a tolerant, democratic and just human society with the pristine spirit of

Islam. For, Iqbal had urged for *Ijtehad* to make Islamic laws and ethos compatible with the modern world.<sup>38</sup> There are enormous challenges faced by the Muslim *Ummah*. The gravity and the multitude nature of the problems, in fact, pose challenges to Islamic thought. Challenges in one form or another, one dimension or another, single or cumulative, direct or indirect in terms of complexity, have confronted Islam throughout its chequered history. Indeed, all through history, Islam has shown resilience to a remarkable degree to meet, offset, counter and overt challenges to its thought. Equally important, the more remarkable thing is that it did all this on the challenger's plane, and in his terms. Imam Ghazzali's *Tahafut al-Falasifah* provides a capital instance.<sup>39</sup> Hence, if Islam faces a complex of challenges today and it must be acknowledged that it does, unless we go in for a frog-in-well approach—Islam has the resilience to meet these challenges.

A few crucial problems demand immediate attention of the Muslim *umamah* taking unanimous world view on certain key issues like Palestine problem and Kashmir issue that threaten the world peace. Israel, in defiance of International law and norms, killing civilians, bulldozing houses and burying alive the inmate and her tanks rolled and made incursions into Palestinian Authority administered territory even destroying Arafat's headquarters, which hardly stirred Washington or International community.<sup>40</sup> Same is the case of Kashmir where innocent people struggling for the their right of self-determination are subjected to state terrorism and high-handedness of India defying the UNO's resolution conceding their unalienable right of self determination. Rather India, after September 11, 2001 incident turning world-wide propaganda campaign against Pakistan, accusing her for cross-border terrorism, despite the fact that Pakistan stood with International community in war against terrorism ceaselessly and faced the consequences as a frontline state.<sup>41</sup> Afghanistan torn by the internal warfare and heavy bombardment by allied forces in thrust of Osama, needs to consolidate and reconstruct her out of wreckage. Iraqi people suffered a lot and are still suffering after the foolish decision of their leadership to wage war against Kuwait facing disastrous consequences. Iraqi people are facing intermittent bombardment by USA/Britain. Has Muslim *Ummah* an answer to these problems as a unified force?<sup>42</sup>

Time has come for the Muslim *Ummah* to develop into an efficient and coherent force in international politics. There are fifty Muslim states encompassing vast areas with rich natural resources and vital geographical locations from the point of view of International sea and air passages.<sup>43</sup> At present, there are multifarious challenges faced by Muslim *Ummah* in a complex uni-polar world. The greatest among these are modernity and western cultural intrusion. Science and technology, modern education and globalization and its implications for Muslim world. These issues are multi-dimensional and complex which needs to be immediately addressed with all-out efforts by the unified Muslim world. What makes it imperative to translate the ideas of great reforms like Afghani and Iqbal into action compatible with the modern world requirements. Islam does not separate service to Allah from service to humanity. Fulfillments of duties to both constitute the essence of righteousness, and men and women are called upon to be on pursuit of righteousness throughout their life.<sup>44</sup> Allah has promised power and prosperity to the believers in this world as well.<sup>45</sup> It is for Muslims themselves to find out how that could be realized. Present alarming situation faced by Muslim *Ummah* demands reawakening of Muslim community in order to answer the questions posed by the modern world to redefine Islamic thought as well as to prepare the *Ummah* to meet with the new challenges in the real world. Material progress, professional excellence and social status among the world community must be our objectives to be achieved through solidarity of the Muslims.

The only viable forum for Muslim *Ummah* at International level, is OIC, which was created in 1969 and formulated its charter and created its formal structure in the early 70s. OIC by its very nature, is an international organization; composed of states that are Muslim in terms of socio-cultural and religious identity and not necessarily in the sense that they have adopted Islam as their official religion. Thus, Islam provides a source of affinity to a group of countries. Which have joined together, under the state-centric framework of OIC an organization of sovereign nations. It is based more in the nature of fraternity rather than a coherent doctrine of unity.<sup>46</sup> Present world has shrunk to an extent to be referred to as a global village, which increased the inter-state interaction

in economic, political and other fields and thereby created a new system of inter-dependence. This system of inter-dependence has stimulated the creation of international organizations and countries continue to come together not only for positive contribution in the field of cooperation in social, economic and political spheres.<sup>47</sup> European union is an example to be quoted. The Muslim states can extend their cooperation from economic sphere to social sector, by initiating joint ventures from trade and commerce to heavy industry and mobile as well as to communication. Also important are, that concrete steps be taken in joint defence mechanism of member countries like NATO. Moreover, there are so many unexplored avenues like health and education, research on science and technology as well as human development which can be pushed forward with the joint efforts and sharing mutual experience of the member countries.

The OIC has made considerable headway not only in its working, but also in being able to evolve a number of subsidiary organs and institutions to coordinate the activities of member states in the area of their common interest, but still there is plenty of room to broaden its scope and functional structure. Since its inception, despite numerous Summit conferences and Foreign Minister's conferences at regular intervals, it fell short of the expectations. In order to produce tangible results either OIC has to be transformed into a vibrant forum or to create a new commonwealth of Muslim countries, which must be an effective coherent force in International politics.<sup>48</sup> There is an imperative need to broaden the scope of the organization (either existing OIC or new commonwealth) on the economic, political and social front. Real hard work is needed to attain the spirit of unity of Muslim Ummah and advancement with the pace of the rest of the world, in the field of science and technology and social economic development. Some sort of permanent arrangements are needed to sustain the growth and development in each major sector with mutual cooperation and pooling the resources of whole Muslim Ummah, Quran also upholds the right to "in the good life to the Believers."<sup>49</sup> Hence, human face of Islam would be manifested through action, which is the real message of Iqbal.



Iqbal being a seer who could see beyond time and space, an outstanding intellectual, who had the quality to visualize the Muslim situation in light of its past history and current predicament and give serious thought to their short and long term problems. Muslim Ummah again has to consolidate its energies and to initiate concurrent efforts to come out of current problems and predicaments. The entire train of Iqbal's thought gravitates towards such kind of Muslim Universalism and collective ego of the community,<sup>50</sup> which had to be translated into reality. As advocated by Iqbal, real action is needed to be initiated to free the spirit of the East, to shatter the shackles imposed by the West. The contemporary world crises are dominated by two gigantic struggles. The outstanding problem is the struggle of the nations of Asia & Africa against the political domination and economic exploitation of the West under the garb of democracy and human rights minus equity and justice. There is a right time to give a wake-up call to the Muslim *Ummah* to maintain coherence and unity among themselves and avail once more the opportunity of regeneration of Muslims in accordance with the essence of Islam.

## CONCLUSION

Some of Iqbal's critics have found his ideas on nationalism inconsistent and contradictory when he justified the abolition of Ottoman *Khilafat* as an *Ijtihadi* act by the Grand National Assembly.<sup>51</sup> As argued in the above discussion, he alongwith the experience and world-wide changing circumstances has tempered his idealism, adjusting his position vis-à-vis nationalism and pan-Islamism, in seeking to resolve the conflict by evolving a synthetic concept of Muslim nationalism or Muslim universalism, which embodies the inherently Islamic direction. That personified Iqbal's pragmatism and above all creativity of high order. Indeed, Iqbal was not opposed to nationalism per-se. What he was against was a sort of nationalism that led to cut throat competition between nations in the West, that deification of the state at the expense of morality, that became the easy tool for the Western exploitation of the East. He opposed the nationalism based on race, language or territory, however, he applauded the venture when a nationalist upsurge was

exploited for regeneration of Muslims and for rehabilitating the power and prestige of mundane Islam. He applied same analogy, for setting up a "consolidated Muslim State" in India. Thus he seems to be pragmatic enough despite his sheer idealistic approach throughout his poetry.

Iqbal a visionary philosopher who could see beyond time and space had a conviction that all independent Muslim territorial units after having achieved sufficient power would adjust racial rivalries and gain enough strength and vigour by the unifying bond of common spiritual aspiration. Cherished ideas of *Ummah's* unity, envisioned by Iqbal, that still are valid has to be translated into reality by the contemporary Muslim world, which is the real answer to their problems and predicament. How that is to be achieved, that is the task of Muslims, which is essential for the regeneration of Muslim *Ummah* in the light of true spirit of Islam.

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## The Election 1985 : An Analytical Study

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AZRA WAQAR

The martial law of 5 July 1977, by General Zai-ul-Haq, which displaced Bhutto's civilian government, was the re-assertion of the military's dominant role in the polity after an interval of five and a half years. The 1973 constitution was suspended. It was not abrogated in order to save himself from being declared a traitor<sup>1</sup> and the General at least initially, projected himself as a reluctant ruler.<sup>2</sup> He argued that the armed forces stepped into the political field, when it became clear to them that the politicians were unable to resolve the political crisis. He emphasized, like other military rulers before him, that neither he nor his fellow officers had any political ambitions and that he would return the country to democratic rule within 90 days. It is another matter that these 90 days stretched to 90 months. Zia-ul-Haq was a good strategist and knew how to survive in adverse conditions. For this purpose he always endeavored to keep the feudals and bureaucrats of the country satisfied.

After suspending the 1973 Constitution, Zia virtually gave successive hand-made new constitutions to the country in the shape of the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO), 1981, and the constitutional amendment of 2 March 1985.<sup>3</sup> The political parties Act, 1962, was also amended by adding new section. 3A, 3B and 3C and by promulgating the Political Parties Ordinance, 1979, on 30 August 1979, under which the political parties were required to get themselves registered with the Election Commission. Under the same enactment, a Majlis-e-Shoora was also set up in 1982 to "fill the political vacuum."<sup>4</sup> The main function of the Majlis, also called the Federal Council, was to recommend to the President new enactments or amendments to existing laws. It had a total strength of 350 members. Similar councils were also set up at the

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Azra Waqar Senior Research Fellow, National Institute of Historical & Cultural Research (Centre of Excellence), Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

provincial level, a 30 member Special Committee of the Majlis-e-Shoora, with Mr. Fida Muhammad Khan its chairman, -was constituted to recommend the future system of Government in the country which presented its report on 23 July 1983.

Addressing the seventh session of this Federal Council on 12 August 1983, President Zia announced his political plan for the restoration of the democratic process in the country. This, he said, was aimed at

- a. holding of general elections to the National Assembly and the four Provincial Assemblies and the Senate.
- b. Forming new Federal and Provincial Governments after the elections.
- c. Lifting of Martial Law.<sup>5</sup>

He also announced his decision to restore the 1973 Constitution with "some necessary amendments" and to hold elections on the basis of adult franchise and to complete this process by 23 March, 1985. The process would start with local bodies elections to be completed within 1983 on non-party basis, and then cover the National and Provincial Assemblies and the Senate. Martial Law was to be lifted after that.

The year 1985 was a year of political activity. It became one of the most important period in the history of Pakistan in the sense that it marked the initiation of democracy after full eight years of Martial Law. The long-awaited and thrice-postponed elections were duly held in February 1985 though on a non-political basis. Prior to these elections, a referendum was held in December 1984 by Zia to establish his position as President. It did not directly seek vote of confidence for him; rather it sought the approval of the people for the process of Islamisation, which was deemed to be a mandate from them for General Zia's stay as president from 1985 to 1990.

### **THE PRE-ELECTION POLITICAL SITUATION**

The pre-election political scenario in Pakistan could not be called suitable for democratic elections. President Zia-ul-Haq had promised

to hold elections after 90 days, from on the day he imposed Martial Law, but as stated above, these 90 days stretched to 90 months. His priorities kept changing, and Islamisation and not the organization of free and fair elections became his main objective. In the seven and half years between July 1977 and February 1985, elections were announced and postponed twice, first to enable the accountability of politicians and then to complete the process of Islamisation. But the people of Pakistan could not remain depoliticised for a long time, and except for a few, almost everyone saw the postponements as an excuse for Zia to stay on anyhow.

President Zia's image suffered both inside the country and abroad for its lack of legitimacy. Yet he was reluctant to hold general elections for nearly eight years for reasons which can only be described as vested interests of Martial Law but the ghost of democracy was never laid and its most important concomitant i.e., credible elections, loomed large over the horizon all these eight years.

The elections announced for 25 February 1985 was to be on a non-party basis under the 12 August 1983 formula, which was far removed from the prescription contained in the 1973 Constitution and contrary to what was demanded by the political parties. Since the main objective of this exercise was to impart a civilian veneer to the status quo, the absence of the political parties from it defeated its purpose. We shall now discuss the main features of political situation prevailing at that time which made these elections dubious in the eye of the people, namely, the referendum, the boycott by the MRD (the alliance of opposition parties), and their party less character.

#### **NATIONAL REFERENDUM 1984**

In pursuance of the Provincial Constitution Order (PCO), 1981 President Zia announced in an address to the nation the holding of a referendum on December 1, 1984. The question to be answered in either 'yes' or 'no' was "Whether the people of Pakistan endorse the process initiated by Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, President of Pakistan, for bringing laws in Pakistan in conformity with the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of

the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and for the preservation of the ideology of Pakistan;<sup>6</sup> for the continuation and consolidation of that process and for the smooth and orderly transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people." The referendum Order, 1984 promulgated by Zia, said that if the majority of votes were in the affirmative, the people of Pakistan would be deemed to have elected Gen. Zia as president for a term of five years from the day of the first meeting of the Houses of Parliament in a joint sitting.

Less than a week after announcing that a referendum would be held, Zia proceeded on a hectic tour of the country covering all the four provinces.<sup>7</sup> Addressing gatherings of councillors, Nazimeen-i-Salaat, members of zakat and ushr bodies, as well as other people, he passionately tried to drive home the point that a positive verdict in the referendum would ultimately lead to a truly Islamic polity economy and judiciary in Pakistan, that continuity in power would ensure the stability that each citizen of the country so patriotically yearned for.<sup>8</sup>

Gen Zia-ul-Haq thus became President of Pakistan for another five years. Although his seeking of the mandate was not a part of the 12 August 1983 plan, he made it clear that he would like to stay on to complete his mission of Islamisation. Again he declared in early November 1984, that the 12 August plan was for "sharing of power" rather than transfer of power. He declared categorically that power would not be transferred unless there was a guarantee of the continuation of the process of Islamisation.<sup>9</sup> Subsequently he made it clear that he aimed at sharing power with the civilian political elite rather than handing over power to them and withdrawing from the political stage.<sup>10</sup> The reaction of the political parties to the referendum can be summed up in three words: they rejected it.

### **MOVEMENT FOR THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY (MRD)**

MRD was an alliance of opposition parties formed in February 1981.<sup>11</sup> Its main demand was the holding of general election on the basis of the 1973 Constitution. Within two years of its formation, the MRD



pooled the human resources of its constituents, evolved a shared set of political objectives and formulated action groups. At local level it sponsored a four-point programme

- (a) an end to Martial Law.
- (b) Restoration of the 1973 Constitution.
- (c) Parliamentary election and
- (d) Transfer of power to public representatives.<sup>12</sup>

Because of the ban on political activities the MRD functioned very much in a twilight zone. Its activity was hampered in equal measure by indecisive leadership and the constraints of Martial Law. But although confusion about strategy and tactics was endemic, the MRD announced an unequivocal stand vis-à-vis any elections which violated the spirit of the 1973 Constitution.

MRD's call for a mass movement from 14 August 1983 threatened the Zia regime, which responded by promising the hold elections before March 1985. The MRD alliance decided to boycott these elections on the ground that not doing so would mean conceding to Gen Zia the right to introduce amendments in the 1973 Constitution. The PPP's individual decision to take part in the local bodies elections of September 1983 in which its candidates were returned in large numbers, weakened the MRD's agitational spirit. Early in the year 1984, Miss Benazir Bhutto, who had been in detention for the last four years, was sent abroad.<sup>13</sup> A ban was also imposed on student's union throughout the country.

Some notable leaders of the MRD like Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, Air Marshal Asgher Khan and Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi were released;<sup>14</sup> from prolonged spells of detention, but their movements were restricted. On the other hand, hard-line leader like Mairaj Muhammad Khan and Rasul Bakhsh Paleejo remained in detention. Mumtaz Bhutto was sent from detention out of the country.

The opposition felt that with thousands of men and women in jail, and with restriction on the press and on the right to assemble, the situation was hardly conducive for the holding of impartial elections. For

free and fair elections it was imperative that candidates should have the freedom to reach the masses and convey to them their programme. As a precondition for participation, the MRD had demanded the elections should be held under 1973 constitution and that the sovereignty of parliament should be restored thus denying Zia's right to amend the Constitution, it also pointed out that political parties were an inherent part of a democratic system, and the purpose of non-party elections could only be to weaken the parties, especially those, which opposed the Martial law government. The establishment on the other hand, felt that the candidates elected on a non-party basis would be amenable to easy manipulation.

The MRD announced its decision to boycott the elections in its meeting held in Abbotabad on 18 and 19 January 1985.<sup>15</sup> Elections derive their importance from the fact that they hold out a promise of change at the top, and the possibility of the opposition coming into power. But the opposition knew that there would be no change as Zia-ul-Haq had got himself elected President for the next five years. So the decision of the MRD to stay away from the polls reflected its belief that the manner and mode in which the election exercise was planned did not vindicate any such expectation of change. It demanded that a caretaker government should be formed for holding fair and free elections within 120 days.<sup>16</sup>

The boycott led the government to arrest many MRD leaders and disqualify them for taking part in the elections. The MRD's major component, the PPP, was more active in London where most of its leaders congregated. The PPP leader of stature left in Pakistan at the end of the year 1984 was Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, though even he had found his own National People Party. Despite the decision to stay aloof from partyless election, many MRD activists contested polls as individuals. The MRD hoped that these members would pressurise the president to lift Martial law, free the political detainees and restore fundamental rights.

The MRD wanted to strengthen its boycott call, while the government fell back on the usual formula of repressions and disqualifying politicians from taking part in the elections, president Zia's

announcement on 12 January was loaded with such a comprehensive list of disqualifications that any hopes that the elections might lead to representative assemblies were substantially quashed. So in view of the low turnout in the referendum and determined opposition to partyless elections, Zia thought it fit to tempt the MRD parties to participate in the polls. He allowed the MRD leaders to hold its meeting at Abbotabad and released Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Maulana Fazlur Rehman and many others. The MRD leaders, however, decided in that meeting to boycott the elections.

The election chaos was created because of a difference of opinion between the common people and the political parties. The people wanted the election but the political parties did not. It was an obvious fact that the boycott call of MRD was not supported by the masses in general. In fact people took keen interest in the election campaign. Subsequently the MRD parties realized their misreading of the political situation and felt that they had missed the bus. Had the MRD shown political foresight and a little bit of daring, it could have seized this chance to mobilize the people and changed the whole course of elections and transfer of power. The large-scale defection of PPP's feudal element, keen to contest the elections in order to retain its hold on local politics, also enhanced this feeling of alienation, because a large number of them either participated directly in the elections or indirectly by supporting other candidates. In Sind<sup>17</sup> and Punjab, barring a few, almost all the feudal families, irrespective of their political affiliations, participated in the election.

The MRD leaders did not take into consideration this feudal element that brought the voters to the polling booths. In a country where feudal relations are so deeply entrenched, and the local Waderas wield so much influence, it was well nigh impossible that the Haris could stay aloof from electioneering and abstain from voting for their landlord. Another factor responsible for failure of the MRD boycott was their lack of any effective means with its members of reaching the people. Almost all their front-rank leaders were either in jail or confined to their hometowns, so the MRD could not propagate the stand for which it had boycotted the elections. Actually the boycott was for the sake of principles; otherwise the MRD fully understood the consequences of this alienation from the political sense.

## NON-PARTY BASIS OF ELECTION

In a true democratic state there is no scope for non-party government. Only president Zia could think of introducing partyless democracy. All major political parties, barring the Jamaat-i-Islami, boycotted the elections and had charged that they were being held to perpetuate one-man rule. Their partyless basis also raised various questions about the future, since the main objective of the elections was to impart some credibility to the status quo. The absence of political parties from the process defeated that purpose. Politicians free of the discipline and regulatory mechanism of party programmes, organization and loyalty, tended to be fickle in their conduct and commitments, and as the restricted electioneering in this case aptly illustrated, narrow selfish interests took precedence over issues of national importance.

Because of the exclusion of parties, the elections were not fought on political or economic programmes or manifestoes, but on the basis of biradari and tribal or sectarian affiliations. The consequences of this reversion to feudal politics undermined the institution of democracy in Pakistan. It also placed serious obstacles in the way of any social and economic reforms in the country.

Despite their non-party feature, the elections could not be described as non-political, for instance, the Jamaat-i-Islami nominated 61 candidates who contested the elections in their individual capacity. The Muslim league (Pagara Group) extended support to over ninety candidates. No party leaders or senior activists belonging to the MRD parties and the JUP participated, but a number of their party-men defied the party directive and took part in the polls. They were later expelled from their parties. Approximately 120 candidates had been associated with the MRD parties; 70 of them were known for their PPP background.<sup>18</sup>

The leading feudal families, tribal chiefs and religious leaders like Sajjada nasheens and pirs, who could not afford to stay out of power game for long due to their stake in local politics, fielded their candidates.

Since the Constitution was held in abeyance, it became necessary to frame a law enabling the President to appoint a new Election Commission and to provide a statutory basis for the proposed elections promised by General Zia within 90 days on 5 July 1977, which of course did not take place. Therefore, the election commission order 1977 was promulgated on 25 July 1977, which empowered the President to appoint a new Chief Election Commissioner and to reconstitute the Election Commission by giving it four members instead of two.<sup>19</sup> A judge from each High Court was appointed a member of the commission to represent the four provinces.

The introduction of the concept of separate electorates for Muslim and non-Muslims, and other innovations conceived by President Zia necessitated amendments to the elections laws. These changes were made through the Election Commission.<sup>20</sup> The number of seats reserved in the National Assembly for non-Muslims was raised from six to eight and distributed<sup>21</sup> among the Provinces, with three seats each going to the Punjab and Sind and one each to the NWFP and Baluchistan. The number of non-Muslim seats in the Provincial Assembly of the Punjab was raised from five to six and that for the Provincial Assembly of Sind from two to seven. Baluchistan remained unaltered with one seat to each Assembly.

Government servants also got involved in the 1985 elections, the representation of People Act, 1976 was amended for these elections, to provide for the appointment of District Returning Officers by the Election Commission.<sup>22</sup> This provision enabled the Commission to appoint Deputy Commissioners/Political Agents as District Returning Officers, who are empowered to approve the list of polling stations proposed to be provided in each constituency by the Returning Officers and accord approval to the list of presiding officers, assistant presiding officer and polling Officers, prepared by the Returning Officer. In this way the interference of government officers was made possible.

### GENERAL ELECTIONS

The election to the National Assembly was held on 25 February and to the provincial assemblies on 28 February 1985. The political plan

announced by the President on August 12 1985 had envisaged that the entire process of holding general elections would be completed by 23 March 1985.<sup>23</sup>

In an address to the Nation on 12 January 1985,<sup>24</sup> the President gave among others the following guidelines relating to the conduct of the elections.

1. The elections will be held on non-party, adult suffrage basis.
2. The system of separate electorates will be followed.
3. The assemblies to be formed as a result of these elections will enjoy full power in all respects within their frameworks.
4. The elections will be held in a free, impartial and fair manner and all candidates will be equal in the eyes of the government. The government, Insha Allah, will remain totally neutral.

The number of seats in the National Assembly had been increased by <sup>27</sup>, including ten more reserved for women and ten additional seats for the minorities. In the Senate 20 seats were been added. Some seats were also added in the Provincial Assembly.

### QUALIFICATION FOR CANDIDATES

By an order issued on 12 January 1985 the president laid down certain additional qualification for candidates to an election. Apart from the existing qualification, these were,<sup>25</sup>

He should be of good character and not commonly known as one who violated Islamic injunction. He should have adequate knowledge of Islamic teachings and practice obligatory duties prescribed by Islam as well as abstain from major sins. And he had not, after the establishment of Pakistan, worked against the integrity of the country or opposed the ideology of Pakistan.

### CANDIDATES

In the National Assembly election 1,594 person filed nomination papers for the 207 seats. After the scrutiny and withdrawal, 1,333

candidates were left in the field. Sixty-one candidates competed for 9 seats reserved for the non-Muslims. The tenth seat was allocated to the Qadianis who refused to put up any Candidate because they disputed their designation as non-Muslims. Similarly, no nominations were received for the seats reserved for Qadianis in the Provincial Assemblies of Punjab, Sind and NWFP. Later the military government transferred these seats to the other minorities.<sup>26</sup>

Approximately 4,821 nomination papers were filled for the 460 seats in the four provincial assemblies. In case of 25 seats reserved for non-Muslim, over 200 nomination papers were received—after scrutiny and withdrawal 3,557 and 196 candidates were left in the field for the Muslim and non-Muslim seats respectively. The highest number of candidates in the National and Provincial assemblies was 15 (Islamabad) and 56 (a constituency in Karachi) respectively. Seven Candidates were elected unopposed to the National Assembly; four from Sindh; two from Balochistan and one from FATA. The number of candidates per seat was as high as 5.5. 27

Despite the call of the MRD to boycott the elections, the largest single chunk of candidates with political affiliations hailed from the self-same combine of political groups. Of the 291 political candidates who contested the 207 National Assembly seats, 120 belonged to one or the other constituent party of the MRD. Though the leaders of these parties opted out of the democratic process, their vain appeals for a boycott, reinforced by threats of expulsion from the party, had little effect on their members whose sound common sense and their wish to remain in the active political field proved to be stronger than the fear of being disowned by their respective parties.<sup>28</sup>

The Jamaat-i-Islami and the Muslim League (Pagara group) actively participated in the polls<sup>29</sup> since they were not a party to the boycott. The voting behaviour of the electorate, resulting in a high rate of turnout, made it clear that it was a massive rejection of the pro-establishment candidates. One hundred and four members of President Zia's Federal Council, nominated by the military government in 1981, contested the

polls. Seventy of them belonged to Punjab; eleven federal ministers also took part in the polls; 14 provincial ministers stood for the National Assembly while a large number of provincial ministers contested elections to their respective assemblies. Twenty-seven ex-servicemen, mostly belonging to the landed aristocracy, were also in electoral race. These included two former chiefs of the Air Force and Navy one Lieutenant General, two Major General, one Brigadier, one Air Commodore and twenty officers of the rank of Colonel or below.

Fourteen women contested the general (Muslim) seats in the National Assembly and 28 were candidate for general seats with provincial assemblies.<sup>30</sup> Only Syeda Abida Hussain was able to win a National Assembly seat while Begum Farhat Khwaja Rafiq and Sajida Nayyar got into the Punjab Assembly.<sup>31</sup> A large number of political nonentities took part in the pools, these included persons engaged in man-power export to the Gulf, real estate dealers who had made money, contractors and transporters, and middle-ranking industrialists and traders. Hence there was quite a proliferation of candidates.

### CAMPAIGN

Five week were given for the election campaign, which passed off in a peaceful manner. The restriction imposed on the candidates was Loud-speakers, open meetings and processions were not allowed. No rigging was noticed. However, these elections could be called mock elections, because all usual formalities of a general election were not fulfilled, and the freedom of choice was controlled because of its partyless basis.

During the campaign the candidates suffered because of the ban placed on their activities. Secondly, as the elections were party less the contenders had no collective manifesto to present. So by discussing only the local problems, the campaign turned into a confrontation among the rich. Money played a vital role in electioneering, and most candidates spent far more on the campaign than was permitted under the law.<sup>32</sup>

After the final acceptance of nomination papers, campaigning was limited to one month. However, under section 144 and a Martial law ordinance, assembly of five or more persons, holding of public meetings,



raising slogans, or carrying placards was disallowed. The ban on the use of public address system generally reduced the ability of candidates to speak to large audiences. This restricted political experiment, foreshadowed in the August 12 proposals was said to be in accord with the spirit of Islamic democracy. Due to the political polarization between the government and the MRD and a restricted election campaign, a lower turnout was seen in some parts of the country.

As a rule, audiences in the campaign were limited between 50 to 400 people and the debate was kept at a district or local level, with issues which normally concern local bodies. The same was true of meetings organized on street corners and in small localities. Because of so many restrictions, banners and posters were considered to most effective means of introducing candidates.<sup>33</sup>

In Hyderabad and Sukkur, the issue of Muhajir-Sindi and Muhajir-punjabi,<sup>34</sup> and in some parts of Sindh the issue of old Sindhi and new Sindhis<sup>35</sup> were dominant. The Jamaat-I-Islami fell victim to the division among its followers on linguistic and ethnic issues in the interior of Sidh.<sup>36</sup> Different workers in Sindh PPP were involved in the election process for different reasons—ethnic, tribal and sectarian—with the result that some PPP workers campaigned for candidates contesting against their political rivals, within the party. The desire to defeat pro-government and anti-PPP candidates also provided an impetus to this abnormal state of affairs. Same was the case with other Major political parties included in the MRD alliance.

## VOTING

Punjab pooled the highest ratio of votes. i.e., 57.90 percent followed by Sindh, 43.55 percent, NWFP 39.4 percent and Balochistan 36.33 percent. The turnout for the provincial assemblies was higher than that for the National Assembly.<sup>37</sup> The comparatively large turnout was symptomatic for the people's faith in the electoral process and restoration of democratic institutions, and demonstrated a high level of political awareness and maturity. Notwithstanding the constraints deliberately

built into them, the National Assembly polls and their outcome surprised the nation. Apart from their narrow political context they also had a large and changing socio-economic background whose long-range influences were not negligible. The high level of the people's participation was taken as a reaction to the deprivation of their right of vote for a very long time.<sup>38</sup>

The negative vote came as the most decisive factor in the election. The rout of pro-establishment candidates bore that out. A majority of ministers lost to relatively young and inexperienced contenders, while out of more than 200 Shoora members barely one-eight survived as MNA's and MPA's in an uncomplicated free election, this would have meant voting the government out of office, but the constitutional arrangement was designed to protect the government from precisely this fate.

In an interview given to London, Miss Benazir Bhutto co-chairperson of the PPP, said that the claim of the government of a high turnout was false. She said that the number of negative votes was high, because wherever a Candidate closely identified with the military regime was contesting, people turned out in large number to defeat him.<sup>39</sup>

For example at the top of the list of ministers who suffered humiliation was federal minister Raja Zafarul Haq who despite having remained prominent in the media for more than five years, lost to his opponent Retd. Air Commodore Khaqan Abbasi. Others who lost were defense Minister Ali Ahmad Talpur, Culture Minister Arbab Niaz, Labour Minister Ghulam Destagir and Minister for Water and Power, Raja Sikandar Zaman. Only Abdul Ghafoor Khan Hoti from Mardan was successful. The loser's list also contained some prominent members of the Majlis-i-Shoora like provincial Minister Mian Salauddin.<sup>40</sup> Another notable figure Syed Asad Gilani, associated with the Jamaat-I-Islami was defeated by provincial Minister Khan Junejo, Elahi Baksh Summro, Zafarullah Jamali and Mohiyu-ud-Din Baloch were elected unopposed.

## RESULT

A large number of candidates affiliated with different political parties participated in the polls in direct violation of their party's decision to boycott the exercise. Among these were a substantial number of ex-MNA's and MPA's from Pakistan Peoples Party, 44 of those who were returned to the National Assembly.<sup>41</sup> The voting percentage and high turnout shows that it was the highest in Punjab, which meant that Punjab seats were fought very keenly, especially in the feudal areas. Generally, the reason can be that politically backward rural Bosses were not alive to the issue of the election's legitimacy and went out to vote, while the urban population was more sensitive to the call of the MRD.

The pattern of voting in Punjab was that 50 percent membership went to the feudal elite and the rest to industrial and commercial magnates and some religious elements. The pattern in rural Sindh, a stronghold of the PPP, was indicative of the people's determination to shunt out party defectors and government affiliates. The only party that managed to record a substantial number of wins was the Muslim League (Pagara group)<sup>42</sup> In fact, in Sindh the population got divided because of the party less style of the election.<sup>43</sup> In Balochistan tribal sardars gained a firm hand in the National and Provincial Assembly. Linguistically 25 out of the newly elected MPA's were Baluchis, 13 were Paktoon, one a settler and one belonging to the Hazara tribe. Five candidates were returned unopposed in the Baluchistan Assembly. In NWFP the result did not indicate any clear political trend.<sup>44</sup>

One noteworthy feature was that, for the first time, the Jamaat-i-Islami was able to get some representation in the National Assembly from all the four provinces. It won four seats in NWFP, four in Punjab, six in Sind, and one in Balochistan. But in Karachi, out of 15 seats, the party could only manage two wins these two were by lesser known personalities. To the surprise of everyone in Karachi, the JUP (Darul Uloom Amjadia Group) won five seats against the Jamaat-i-Islami. The performance of the Pakistan Muslim League (Pagara group) was quite good, for 42 of its Candidates went to the National Assembly, thereby acquiring a special position in Parliament.<sup>45</sup>

Relatively young locals succeeded in dislodging older defenders of the establishment. Religious elements received a considerable setback in politically more alive areas. Those who entered the assemblies were still a blend of the old and the new without any defined identification with any socio-economic platform or programme. The members returned to the assemblies, however, demonstrated one thing clearly, the voter's faith and liking for the democratic system of election and his ability to make the best of his options in any given situation.

In urban constituencies such as Karachi, Hyderabad, Lahore, Rawalpindi and Peshawar, many candidates from the middle class returned. But businessmen and industrialists in these constituencies made no significant breakthrough, despite high investment and organized campaigns. Six ex-armed forces officers were elected from various provinces. They included Air Marshal Nur Khan, Lt. Gen. Abdul Hamid and Major Gen. Bashir Ahmed.<sup>46</sup> In Punjab and Sind, which had both been strongholds of the PPP many well-known feudal politicians who were swept out of politics by the party in the 1970 elections returned to the political arena? In NWFP, Jamaat-I-Islami made significant gains,<sup>47</sup> which had 4 seats for this province in the National Assembly. This province being a strong hold of National Awami Party and Jamiat Ulema Islam, the Jammata-e-Islami owed its success to the absence of these two parties from the elections. In Punjab and Sind, however, the outcome and composition of the list of successful candidates would have been totally different had the MRD fielded candidates. The absence of Wali Khan, Asghar Khan, Maulana Fazlul Rehman and other political stalwarts from the race left the field wide open both for new entrants and elements rejected earlier. In Baluchistan the tribal hold which had began disintegrating to some extent during the 1970 election revived with the absence from the field of the former National Awami Party leader who had secured all the four National Assembly seats from Baluchistan in 1970 election.<sup>48</sup>

The results of the 1985 elections were in sharp contrast to those of the 1970 polls, which had brought the PPP to power. In 1970, because of the PPP's radical<sup>49</sup> manifesto and the slogan of "roti, kapra aur makan", which had really stirred the masses, the old guard of feudal, landlords and businessmen had been all but routed. For the first time in the history of Pakistan, the middle class and even the lower middle class – had made an entry into the assemblies. In 1985 there were no parties to present their programmes, no manifestoes and no electioneering of the kind that the people were accustomed to. The consequence was that individuals, who had the money to fight the elections, did so and carried the day. It is true that their known association with the political parties helped them to win, but the effect was marginal. Most of all, there was no "left" or "right" this time and no "awampasand" or "Islam-pasand" parties. The people voted on the basis of the individual's ability to muster support, spend money and exploit considerations of biradari, ethnicity and sectarianism.<sup>50</sup>

The phenomenon was repeated in the provincial assemblies too, which gave place to 31 members of old landed families who had dominated Pakistan, politics before the 1970 elections. Many of them were closely related to those who were elected M.N.A.'s this time.

The absence of political parties from the elections and restriction on political activities gave the landlords a virtual walkover in 1985. As stated above several members of certain families got representation in all the bodies. To mention a few, five members of the Soomro family Elahi Bux, Rahim Bux, Ahmed Mian, Junaid and Iftikhar – were elected to the National and Sind Provincial Assembly and the Senate. Similarly two sons (Pasha and Masood) and a daughter-in-law (Rasheeda) of the late Ayub Khuhro, who was defeated by Mr. Z.A. Bhutto in 1970 returned to the National and Sind Assemblies. While the Pir of Pagara entered the Senate, two of his sons (Sibghatullah Rashdi and Syed Ali Gauhar) were elected to the Sind and National Assemblies respectively. Ejaz Ali Talpur, who, after the death of his father Ghulam Ali Talpur (a veteran politician and one of the biggest landlords of Sind), was MNA during the Ayub and Bhutto periods and later became a provincial minister under the martial law regime, returned to the Provincial Assembly, while his son, Inayat Ali Talpur made his debut in the National Assembly. Many other close relatives of his were elected to the various houses/<sup>51</sup>

The position was not very different in Punjab, where the seats were divided among a few entrenched feudal families like Gilanis and Qureshi and Gardezis (Multan) Noons and Tiwanas and Awans (Sargodha) Rajas (Jhelum), Mazaris and Legharis (Dera Ghazi Khan) and the Amir of Bahawalpur's family/<sup>52</sup>

In the Frontier, Aslam Khatatak, his sister Kulsum Saifullah, her son Salim Saifullah, and other close relatives, were elected to the national and Provincial Assemblies. In Baluchistan too, because of the absence of prominent leaders from the scene, the lists of the successful were dominated by tribal and feudal families. Even the reserved seats for women went to wives, sisters and other near relatives of the elected members.<sup>53</sup>

Polling for the seats reserved for women was held on 13 March, and of the senate on 14 March.<sup>54</sup> The election of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies, and the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Senate followed. President Zia-ul-Haq nominated Muhammad Khan Janjoo as the Prime Minister and invited him to form the Cabinet. Provincial governments including Governors and Chief Ministers were named in the 2nd week of April

## ANALYSIS

Elections 1985 could be viewed as a vital link between two phases, the polity in force since July 1977 and the new democratic spirit. They paved the way for democracy after a long spell of martial law, in which there was no freedom of expression, with all the political parties forced to be inactive. In these circumstances the opposition parties stood for the cause of democracy to the best of its ability. They formed their alliance (MRD) and demanded that there should be an end to Martial law and people should be given the right to elect their own government.

The demand erupted in the form of agitational protest in Sindh in 1983. This event was of far-reaching importance consequently president Zia. Sensing the impact of the MRD movement, announced his August

12, 1983 formula for holding elections. The most noteworthy feature of the coming election was to be its partyless character. Taking shelter behind the Islamization process, President stressed before the elections that they were being held in order to establish an Islamic system of government and an Islamic political system. He made an impassioned plea to the electorate to realize the importance of the vote, because it was not only their national duty but also their religious duty to participate in the elections. Two months ago he had already been elected president, through a referendum, for a term of five years. This referendum was an ingenious effort on the part of Zia to link his political legitimacy with Islam. Surely, (he must have thought) the people could not vote against an Islamic system. But contrary to Zia's expectations, the turnout, despite much canvassing, lobbying and persuasion on the part of the government functionaries, was low.

However, the people participated in the general elections with enthusiasm, because they had the ability to distinguish between the hollowness of the referendum and the semblance of representative rule that the elections offered. But as we have seen these elections were held under some restrictions and most of the country's political parties and politicians could not take part in them. Only people in their individual capacity could participate; there were no open meetings and no canvassing, and even microphones were not allowed, which reduced the chances of proper political mobilisation. In such elections the voter can merely notify choices already made by the dictator or the ruling party. Thus the electoral process was carefully tailored to exclude the existing political parties and to bring forward a political leadership, which could facilitate the military administration in the transition from Martial law to Civilian rule.

The MRD had decided to boycott these elections. After long years of alienation and misunderstanding between the two sides, a non-party election could not have been their choice. Had the MRD openly expressed its willingness to participate in the elections, subject of course to certain minimum pre-condition, the government would have been thrown into confusion and the sputtering election campaign under way would have been completely derailed and the slightest political pressure would have set into motion the paralyzed will of the nation.

The MRD was by-passed in the whole process of civilization of the regime. Indeed it was bogged down also by internal dissensions. Some party cadres were defeated when they contested elections against party directives, while others played a partisan role in their respective constituencies. In general the MRD found an atmosphere of despondency prevailing amongst its component parties.

After the MRD boycott, the government faced the problem of showing to the world that the people have actually participated in the elections. Therefore it was decided to waive the conditions, which barred the MRD politicians from participation/ after that the regime was in a better position to get the desired results easily. We do not have to ravel very far back in our history for an instructive example/ The established political leadership was prevented from participating in the 1962 elections, and the so-called leaders who came to the fore lacked public confidence and were viewed by the people more as collaborators legislators. Election even than were held peacefully, but the electoral process failed to serve the desired ends. Ayub Khan, instead of securing popular support, fell back upon the support of two groups: bureaucrats and feudal lords. In the 1985 elections too bureaucrats and a number of feudal lords sought to entrench themselves at the expense of the people. The rationale offered for keeping the political parties off the elections was that this way the political system could be purged of malpractices and the arrangement would eliminate the bitterness of political grouping. But in this, several other unforeseen problems surfaced. The biggest one was the fact that political parties had no responsibility to play a positive role since the individual superseded them in importance. People with resources pressurized the political element to join their camp. This kind of grouping could not be equated with Islamic system of clean elections. For example, in Lahore the Arains and the Kashmiris had taken part in the common men's mind. First, how could elections is allowed on a group basis when their being hold on party-based was considered to be un-Islamic? Secondly, in party - based election poor candidates could also come to the assemblies by virtue of their political or professional qualifications while in party elections such chances were remote.



Because of non-party polls, notables from social and economic fields gained a foothold in the corridors surrounding the chamber of power. The big landlords used their political power, first and foremost, to safeguard the existing system of agrarian relations and defend it against any change. The dominance of feudals and pirs have always helped civil and military bureaucratic rule. Such an alliance between the civil and military bureaucracy and landlords is in fact based on mutual interests.

The feudal traditional hold on the peasants working their land has been largely responsible for their victory, since the elections were not contested on any political, economic or social programme, biradari sentiment and feudal and religious influences played a major role in the regression of the political level to pre-partition days when feudal and tribal bondages prevailed. These families have always dominated the political scene since independence and were committed to their own vested interests like keeping a hold on local politics.

In the 1985 elections many feudal and religious personalities were elected. They were not leaders of religious parties, but pirs and sajjada nashins who exploit religious fervour for personal political ends. In most part of the country the man in charge of religious shrines and a holy place has inherited this usually lucrative and influential position, finding himself highly regarded by the backward and oppressed sections of the population. No wonder that many of them are tempted to add political prestige to their personal esteem. In the circumstances it is not difficult for them to secure votes from their murids, who in fact do not have any other choice. In Sind and Punjab there is a long list of such 'holy men' who are actively involved in politics and win seats in the legislative assemblies.

In Sind the Pagaras, the Pir of Ranipur and the syeds of Nawabshah not only wield religious influence, they are also big landlords. They exploited both these factors to win the 1985 elections. Similarly, in Multan, the Gardezis and Gillanis, apart from their feudal hold, wield considerable religious influence. In the political field the Pirs and sajjada nashins always join forces with the landlords, because both are rural

based and the pirs are landlords too. This pattern of elite representation must be seen in comparison with the policy of previous regimes. For example, Ayub Khan expanded his constituency in the country by following an activist policy, thus creating a power base for himself in the form of big businessman and rich farmers, as well as the enterprising middle class. Z.A. Bhutto likewise created an entirely new stratum, comprising the petty bourgeois and middle class peasant as well as urban middle class intelligentsia and poor people as his power base against such activist policies. President Zia followed a passive policy. Instead of creating a constituency for his government, he just co-opted local power-holders into the current political setup, since a pro-status quo tendency had made it safe for the feudal and commercial elite to operate on his terms of elections. This trend worked in favour of those who could master maximum economic political, factional and administrative strength, especially as there were no political parties to bail them out of their ideological weakness. Power was thus more central in this election than ever before. President Zia was supported by most big landlords, traders, industrialists, successful professionals, bureaucrats, and of course the armed forces. The consequence of this diversion to feudal and elite politics further undermined the democratic institutions, and became a serious obstacle in the way of any progressive social and economic reforms in the country. The elections fanned local sectarian and biradari differences. In most elections political party manifestos are the subject of debate, but in 1985 elections candidates tried to win over support on the basis of various prejudices-issues of foreign policy and freedom of speech and expression were not raised even in the leaflets. On the other hand, the establishment of Islam was made an issue, as if the elections were being held in a country where people were opposed to it. Zia-ul-Haq wanted to mobilize the people in the name of Islam. This overriding focus on Islamisation eclipsed all other matters. Only local issues came to the surface while national issues such as foreign affairs, economic federal policies, provincial autonomy and various aspects of Islamization were conspicuous by their absence. It was an election without issues and ideology, in which local influence in terms of financial hold of landlords over peasants, relations with the local bureaucracy and cash expenditure emerged as the deciding factors. That was the reason also, why the turnout in rural areas were higher than in the urban centers.

Despite the lack of issues, the voter turnout throughout the country was, with some variations, higher than either official or public expectations. The figures given by the Election Commission of Pakistan show an overall turnout of 53 percent, only slightly less than the 1970 and 1977 elections, when the turnout, which Zia-ul-Haq wanted to take as a gesture in his favour, actually reflected the electorate's yearning for the restoration of the political process. He corined the competitive democratic process and endeavoured that no opposition should come forth.

The negative vote came through as the most decisive factor in these elections. The rout of the members of the Majlis-e-Shoora and pro-establishment Jamaat-I-Islami bore that out. The Jamaat suffered for its association with the Martial law regime and its top-ranking leadership suffered humiliating defeat at the hands of lesser known opponents. The election process demonstrated that political affiliations could not be erased.

The style of elections was also criticised on some other counts. Ministers in power were not relieved of office, while assigning of a Commissioner and ending the restriction on the voters to show identity cards at the time of casting their votes made these decisions suspect. However, despite being a tame and colourless affair the elections were not totally uneventful. Within the emasculated framework, a new Assembly was voted in. A political process was set in motion, answering some questions and raising others.

The amendments made by Zia to the 1973 Constitution converted the parliamentary system, into a veritable presidential system with a nominated prime Minister whom President Zai appointed. It goes to Junejo's credit that he won a unanimous vote of confidence from the newly elected National Assembly.

So a parliament of Pakistan came into being after the elections with Zia-ul-Haq as president, though it was under the umbrella of Martial law and with all powers vested in the hands of the President./CMLA. Parliament and the Prime Minister were no more than his handmaidens.

But this was how it was all intended to be. The purpose of the controlled democracy was to provide a legal basis for the status quo, not to hand over power to this or that bunch of politicians. The new system, therefore, provided no change but the continuation of the prevailing power structure. The elected legislature did not enjoy the benefit of a political programme voted in a clear mandate sanctioned by the electorate. It was a blend of old and new politicians and non-politicians conversant only with the local difficulties of their constituencies.

Looking from Zia's point of view, the elections were not non-representative because of the exclusion of political parties, or because of the constitutional amendments. As this parliament represented the people and not the political parties, and Islam does not bind the people to any particular form of elections or government, the two houses gradually asserted themselves. The elected representatives already knew the advantages and disadvantages of the Assemblies and the role they were going to play in them. Whatever the basis of the elections and whatever the advantages and disadvantages of this basis, President Zia found, as time passed, that he could not manipulate parliament as completely as he would have wished. Except for the initial period when the National Assembly succumbed to his pressure in order to get him to lift Martial law, it operated with fair amount of independence and self-will with Junejo as Prime Minister.

Anyhow, these elections at least paved the way for restoration of the democratic process in the country. It meant the initiation of civilian rule after a long Martial law, culminating in the restoration of the 1973 Constitution and the installation of an elected government. The redeeming feature of great significance of these elections was that they convinced the people of the absolute necessity of normal political activity and regular elections based on political parties. They realized that politics based on political parties and party manifestoes was a *sine qua non* of a modern democracy. They also came to know after long

years of military rule that this was best achieved by political parties having grassroot organization and popular support, such parties lose their importance only when and if new forces take their place and are better able to articulate the aspirations of the people. A change was needed to break the strangulating conditions, created by Martial law. There is no doubt that Elections 1985 duly served to provide that change.

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3. The Herald, April, 1985, p.27

4. Report of the General Elections 1985, Vol. I, (Islamabad: Elections Commission of Pakistan, 1986), p.6

5. *ibid.*, p.20 for full text see Safdar Mehdi, Politics without Parties (Lahore: SAHE, 1988), p.49-63.

6. *ibid.*

7. The Herald (monthly), January 1985, p.39

8. Every Citizen who was enrolled as a voter under the Electoral Act of 1974 was entitled to vote in the referendum. According to Official sources, the counting showed that out of the 3, 49 and 92,425 registered voters a total of 217, and 50, 901 or about 62.2 percent had cast their votes. of these 2,15,53,757 i.e., 97.71 percent were in favour while 3,16,918 were in the negative and 1,80,326 were declared invalid. Report of the General Elections 1985., p.43.

9. The Herald (Monthly), January 1985 pp 37-39

10. Salim Hunan, *siyai itihad Aur Pakistani Siyasat par Asraat: 1947-1990*, (Lahore: Jang Publisher, 1993), p.155
11. The alliance consisted of nine parties, namely: Pakistan Peoples Party, Tehrik-I-Istiqlal, National Democratic Party, Pakistan Republican Party, Ulema-I-Pakistan Conference (JUP), Pakistan Muslim League, Kashmir Muslim Conference, National Liberation Front, Mazdoor Kisan Party. M.waseem .392
12. The Herald, January 1985. p.35
13. *ibid.*, p.36
14. *ibid.*, February 1985. p.25
15. *ibid.*, p.32
16. *ibid.*, March 1985, p.26
17. Dr. Hasan A. Rizvi, "The 1985 General Election-I" The Muslim, 7<sup>th</sup> January, 1986.
18. *ibid.*, p.17
19. Report of the General Elections 1985. p.13
20. *ibid.*, p.14
21. *ibid.* p.116
22. *ibid.*, p.55 Safdar Mehdi, pp.,49.63
23. Report of the General Elections 1985 pp. 56-58.
24. *ibid.*, p.62
25. *ibid.*, pp. 160-61
26. *ibid.*, pp. 161-62
27. The Morning News, 25<sup>th</sup> February 1985.
28. The Herald, February 1985, p.36
29. Report of the General Elections 1985 p.163.
30. Safdar Mehdi.
31. The Herald, April 1985, p.48
32. Safdar Mehdi. P.30
33. The Herald, March 1985, p.32
34. *ibid.*, February 1985., p.35
35. *ibid.* ch 1985, p.32
36. Report of the General Elections 1985, p.95 226
37. The Pakistan Times, 26 February 1985.

38. The Total population of Pakistan recorded as a result of the 1972 census was 6,53,09,340 and voters being 3,43,96,661 polled for 207 contested seats; Punjab 115, Sind 43, NWFP 26, Baluchistan 7, FATA 8, Federal Capital 1 and minorities 6. in regard to the Provincial Assemblies 506 seats were contested: Punjab 240, Sind 100, NWFP 80, Baluchistan 40 and minorities 23. *ibid.*, p.93, 99, 226, 227, 230, 244, 251.

39. *The Herald*, March 1985, p.21

40. *ibid.*, p.20.

41. *ibid.*, March 1985 pp.22-26.

42. *ibid.*, p.32

43. *ibid.*,

44. *ibid.*, p.34-35.

45. *ibid.*, pp. 23,33.

46. *ibid.*, March 1985, p.22

47. *ibid.*, p.23.

48. *ibid.*,

49. *The Herald*, Aril 1985, p.41

50. if we look at the result list we note how feudal and the capitalists stages a comeback in the 1985 election. For example in the National Assembly we saw:  
 Nawabzada Abdul Ghfoor: NA-6, Mardan, Muhammad Aslam Khatta: NA-11, Kohat, Niar Ali Khan Chaudhry: NA-40, Rawalpindi, Raja Muhammad Afzal: NA-44, Jhelum-I, Nawabzada Mazhar Ali NA-47, Gujrat-I, Ch.Shujjat Hussain: NA-48, Gujrat-II Malik Hur Hayat khan: NA-59, Sarghoda-v, Sardar Asaf Ali: NA-89, Kasur-I Maucab Ali Khan: NA-97, Sheikhpura-v, Hamid Nasir Chatta: NA-98, Gujranwala-I Makhdumzada syed Hasan Mahmud, NA-150, Rahimyarkhan-IV, Ellahi Bux Soomro: NA-154, Shikarpur-I, Syed Hamid Raza Gilani: NA-115, Multan-V, Syed Zafar Ali Shah: NA-158, Nawabshah-I, Syed Ali Gohar Shah: NA-162, Khaipur-I, Qazi Abdul Majid Abid: NA-171, Hyderabad-V some old rulers and Sardars were also seen for example: Shahzada Mohayyuddin: NA-24, Chitral, Mir Balakh Sher Mazari: NA-126, Rajanpur, Shahzada Saeed-ur Rehid Abbasi: NA-140, Bahawalpur-I, Wazir Ahmed Jomezai: NA-200, Zhob, Taj Muhammad Sardar: NA-201, Karachi, Mir Ahmed

Nawaz Khan Bugti: NA-202, Kalat, there were also some new faces like Akhtar Rasool PP-102, Lahore and religious elements like Wasi Mazhar Nadvi, NA-168 Hyderabad-II, and Shah Baleeghud-Din NA-185 Karachi West and Industrialists Like Nawaz Sharif, NA-86, and Lahore-V,

.For further details see Safdar Mehdi.

51. The Herald, April 1985. p.41

52. Ibid.,

53. Ibid., p.42

54. Report of the General Elections 1985. pp.251, 161,271



# Community Participation in Forest Management, Darel Valley, Northern Areas of Pakistan

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DR. ZAHID JAVED

## INTRODUCTION

This paper is based on field work during 1993-96 focusing on traditional forest management in Darel Valley. The people of the valley have inherited a tradition of Community Participation for managing their forests. This centuries old tradition is still surviving in an area which carries enormous scope for research. Preliminary results of the study are recorded and analyzed in this paper.

## THE AREA

The valley of Darel is located in Diamer district, South West of Gilgit, the administrative center of Northern Areas of Pakistan. Gupis and Puial valleys of Ghizar district are situated in the north. The area is linked with Karakoram Highway (KKH) near Shatial with suspension bridge across the River Indus. The administrative Center of the valley at Gumari is approximately 18 kms away from KKH and a jeepable road links it from Shatial suspension bridge.

The area formed a part of Yaghestan – the land of wild and independent people (Leitner 1880:84). The area was not colonized by the British administration of India. However, the administration remained concerned about them during the "Great Game" and left them to survive as a "neutral zone between the British and the Russian spheres of influence."

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Dr. Zahid Javed, Assistant Professor, Department of Social Work, University of the Punjab, Lahore.

## THE PEOPLE

The people of the Area have been portrayed as a "republican community" (Biddulph 1880:84). The contemporary Western critics recognize it as an "acephalous society" (Barth 1952:79). Constituting tribes, socially and politically fragmented and "organized in segmentary lineages" (Staley 1969: 225-43). The society comprises four lineages of Shin, Yeshkun, kamin and Dom called holsa (Original inhabitants, owners of resources— land, forest, pastures and water etc). some other social groups of Pathan ( Syed Akhund), Kohistani, Gujar, (pastoralists) and Maruts (Gold sifters also inhabit the area. They are declared opra (outsider). The valley comprises four villages Gayal, Phuch, Samigal and Manikal.

## SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

In the area, village population is organized into large sectors, presenting a sectoral design of social organization. Every sector is identified as heti comprising a specific number of households. "A heti is a cluster of household of owners (holsa) representing a large section of population independent of kinship and caste, dividing the village population into certain sections, e.g., there are six heti in village Samigal" (Zahid 1998:415-427). A heti determines and ensures economic interest of its members (holsa). Whereas, non-owners "outsiders (opra) are excluded from village organization and are deprived of the rights to claim ownership of basic resources" (ibid 1997: 63-73). The economic resources involve cultivation of farmland on household basis and the communal ownership of forests, range land and alpine pastures. The original inhabitants inherit membership of certain heti. The membership of a heti establishes right of forest and other resources of the area and protect their interest with regard to resources. Non-owners are heavily taxed for utilizing resources of the area. Severe sanctions are imposed upon them for violating traditions of the area. The villages of the Darel Valley, Samigal Bala, Manikal Bala consists of 6 heti each, while village Samigal payeen is organized into 4 heti. A heti is subdivided into three sub sectors known as tao. In Samigal Bala there are 18 tao and Samigal payeen comprises 12 tao.

## SUBSISTENCE AND ECONOMY

Following land resources

1. Agriculture
2. Forestry
3. Grazing livestock
4. Pasturage
5. Gathering

Most of the resources provide wealth in the form of food grain and butter, which is used to fulfill the needs of household and exchanged with consumer goods. People of the area derive hard cash by commercially exploiting the forest wealth of the area.

### FORESTRY

In the Northern Areas of Pakistan Chilas and Dar Tangir subdivisions are exceptions, where forests are privately owned and exploited on commercial lines, all the other forest stands of the Northern Areas are classified as "Government Protected Forest" (Sheikh & Aleem 1975: 197-235, 296-324). Forestry plays a vital role in the life pattern of people of the area. Forests of the area are richly supplied with deodar, chir & kail. Wood and green leaves are used as :

1. Construction material
2. Household utensils
3. Fuel
4. Green leaves are used as fodder for livestock. ( the goats are fed with leaves of an evergreen holm-oak known locally as (banni, quercus Baloot)

### FOREST RIGHTS

The inhabitants of village Samigal have retained their right of forests from the time of creation of Pakistan in an agreement made in 1951.

According to this agreement the Government and elders (jeshtero) have mutually agreed.

1. that protection, supervision, cutting, growth and development of forest will be made in consultation with people of the area, in their best interest and expenditure involved will be paid by the Government of Pakistan.
2. That the Government is authorized to spend income of forest in national interest and welfare not exceeding from 1/3 of this income.

Forest rights are restricted not exceeding to original inhabitants (holsa) of the area. Whereas, outsiders (Opra) are deprived of forest rights. However, they are allowed to get wood for their household needs, construction material, fuel, grazing livestock, in return for their services.

The people of the village Samigal Bala manage their own forest. Traditionally, presenting an example of indigous community participation. They have evolved a mechanism for this purpose. The mechanism of community participation stems from the right of ownership of resources and translates itself in the village council (sigas). The original inhabitants (holsa) have key position and play a vital role in this context.

### VILLAGE COUNCIL (SIGAS)

Sigas is an assembly of leading elders of holsa called jeshtero. Sigas comprises representatives of each sector of population called heti. The following description clearly demonstrates structural dimension as well as functional aspect for Sigas evolved by community of the area.



Three leading elders (jeshtero) one from cash tao (a threefold subdivision of heti) represent their respective heti in sigas and one of them presides over its proceeding. Its composition reflects the principle of parity instead of following the proportional representation. The oral history of the area depicts that the population of village Samigal Bala was equally distributed into six sectors (heti) at the time of constitution of this sectoral design of social organization. However, presently the size of heti differs from one another. Nevertheless the people of the area are bound to follow it strictly and smaller's well as larger heti have equal representation in their village assembly (Sigas) despite the fact that some of them have less membership while the others have more members.

Traditionally, healdman (jeshtero) are leading elders of original inhabitants (holsa), they belong to a senior line of autocracy" (Jettmar 1980: 85). They come from Shin and Heshkun lineages of owners having very high status in social hierarchy respectively. Whereas, kamin and Dom form the lowest class of owners. They have no representation in chosen assembling (Sigas) of elders. Sigas is community gathering organized for discussing and resolving issues of the community and performs threefold functions

1. Legislative Forum
2. Executing Agency
3. Judicial Institution

### **FOREST MANAGEMENT**

The management is undertaken through consultation in sigas (village council). The people of the area have evolved a traditional authority pattern, which assures equilibrium in different social groups. The traditional authority stems from the sigas. Which delegates some power to the jeshtero (head man) for fulfilling certain ascribed roles. A jeshtero

selects kalik (traditional revenue collector) and zaitu (policeman of the area).

**MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE:**



**Jeshtero:**

A jeshtero is a leading and wise of the area, who establishes his respect and command because of his bravery, honesty and eloquence over the period of time.

**Kalik:**

Kalik is an experienced sharp and argumentative person having knowledge of counting and good memory. A headman of hetu selects Kalik after consultation with members of the hetu. He collects revenue from people of the area.

**Zaitu**

Every holsa during the prime of his youth with a good health and fighting skills works as Zaitu for one year and assists Kalik. He is assigned constant vigilance of forest and other territorial affairs.

The effectiveness of the Darel forest management lies in the complex system of checks, balances and network of informants (kalik and Zaitu), deriving their power from traditional village council.

Traditionally, the collectors and policeman of the area are apprehensive of outsiders and they do not allow intervention in their territorial affairs. They check any intervention in their forest. They are

paid no reward or salary in return for their services but they do generate revenue for themselves by imposing certain sanctions on deviants for violating traditions of the area irrespective of *holsa* or *opra*. They are supervised by the *jeshtero* and their activities are monitored and evaluated through discussions in *Sigas*. Which is also a forum for settling their conflicts.

### DECISION MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION

Traditionally, the *sigas* deal with matters of forest management. The sale of forests and the price of timber is negotiated with community elders (*Jeshtero*) of the area. After consulting members of their respective *heti*, an agreement is drafted and attested by the Assistant Commissioner of the area. The forest Department prepares a scheme for logging which includes demarcation of trees and cubic feet of timber to be cut by the contractor. The contractor cuts and extracts according to the scheme.

### CHECKING DEFORESTATION TRADITIONALLY

The autonomy of the local population in the village makes control of logging very difficult. Most of the logging in private forests of Northern Areas occurs in Darel and Tangir Valleys.

Inhabitants of the area consume their forest periodically. After a specific period of time, village councils impose ban on illicit cutting as well as grazing livestock in a prohibited forest. Traditionally law comes into play and the village council imposes fines on deviants. However, some respondents of the present study speak of illicit cutting. Nevertheless, Schickhoff and Knudsen present a different point of view. Schickhoff claims that "the private forests in the Diامر District (Chilas and Darel, Tangir Subdivision) are subject to commercial exploitation that hardly follows the principle of sustainable forestry" (Schickhoff 1992: 50-59). Knudsen relates deforestation with the state of road network in the area. According to him "perhaps the only feature which has helped slow the rate of deforestation, has been in the case of Darel

and Tangir, the lack of truckable roads, Until recently, only jeeps could enter the valleys, thereby limiting the effectiveness and scale of time operations" (Knudsen 1995:32).

### **FOREST MONEY & ROYALTY**

The community receives the price of forest money, which is the main substantial source of their income. The forest money is decided with the contractor on the basis of the quality of cubic feet extracted and marketed, the local rate was about rupees 50/cubic feet during the study (95/96). The community also receives 50% of the royalty, which is worked out on the basis of rates fixed by the forest Development Corporation (FDC) at Dargai (N.W.F.P). A contractor can market his timber from Chilas onwards, subject to the payment of the price of timber plus royalty, which is controlled and managed by the Forest Department. The contractor deposits the price of the timber at 50% of the royalty in the account of the Deputy Commissioner and 50% of the royalty in the government account. The Deputy Commissioner in return pays the money to the community elders twice a year, in June and December.

### **DISTRIBUTION OF FOREST MONEY**

The community has its own system of distribution according to their traditional organizational units (heti). Under this system of distribution, males get one full share and females half a share (with the exception of Manikal, Darel Valley, where each individual irrespective of age or gender gets a full share). The average income per family ranges from 7000 to 16000 rupees annually, depending on household size.

### **CONCLUSION**

It emerges from the study that a deep-rooted community participation in forest management is still vogue in Darel valley. The valley is inhabited by an acephalous society. It constitutes tribes, socially and politically organized in segmentary lineages of Shin, Yeslikun,



Kamin and Dom called *holsa*. They have property rights in natural resources of the area including land, forests, pastures and water etc. the non-owners *opra* – *pathan*, *Gujar* (pastoralist), *Soniwal* (Goldsifters) and *Kashiro* (Kashmire)- have no claim over resources of the area. The inhabitants of the area have inherited a tradition of community participation for managing their resources. They present an effective forest management. Its effectiveness lies in the complex system of checks and balances besides a network of informants- *kalik* (traditional revenue collector) and *zaitu* (traditional policeman of the area). For constant vigilance of their forests, they continuously patrol and check interventions in their forests. They are led by *jeshtero* (headman), representing members of a certain *hetia* cluster of household, independent of kinship and caste.

Forest rights are vested with original inhabitants of the area. Leadership of inhabitants of the area as well as decision-making for forest management is restricted to *shin* and *Yashkun*—from higher social strata, while, *kamin* and *Dom* have low status in social hierarchy. They do not qualify for leadership according to local traditions of the area. However, they have an equal claim over forests as well as their share in forest royalty is not less than those of *Shin* and *Yashkun*. The outsiders (*opra*) have no claim over the resources of the area. They are not made part of decision-making process for resource management. Nevertheless, fulfillment of their economic needs is ensured by the original inhabitants. In return they actively take part in economic activity, illicit cutting is checked and monitored by the traditional authority—*kalik*, *Zaitu*. These measures help them to cope with challenges of misuse of forest.

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### **Notes to Contributors**

Manuscripts, articles, book reviews and notes or letters on themes of contemporary or historical interest, with particular reference to South Asia, will be welcome.

Manuscript should be clearly typed on one side of the paper only, and should be double-spaced. Two copies should be submitted.

Bibliographies and footnotes should be placed at the end of the article. Footnotes should be numbered consecutively, and bibliographies should be arranged alphabetically. Foreign words should be underlined.

Bibliographical references should be completed in respect of the title of the book, the name of the author, the year and the place of publication.

Utmost care should be taken to prepare statistical data for publication. All headings, columns, rows, symbols, units of measurement, periods, political and geographical areas, and sources should be clearly stated in each statistical table, instead of giving such explanations in the text.

Tables, maps, and diagrams should be numbered and given at the end of the article, each on a separate sheet of paper. They should be clearly drawn so that they are suitable for photocopying as submitted.

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